SENEGAL

A STUDY IN FRENCH ASSIMILATION POLICY

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PREFACE

114 THIS short study of Senegal with particular reference to France's policy of assimilation of her colonial peoples is the result of a number of visits made to Senegal since 1955. However, most of the material was gathered in the months of January, February and March of 1961 while I was in Senegal participating in a major research project sponsored by the Institute of Race Relations and directed by Mr. Guy Hunter, which has resulted in his recently published *The New Societies of Tropical Africa.* I am particularly grateful 121 to Mr. Hunter for indirectly giving me the opportunity to collect material for this book, for there [illegible] a great dearth of material in English on the French-speaking states of Africa. I must also thank Mr. Philip Mason who first suggested the idea of writing such a book, which I hope will help to give some idea of the special character of the African country that was most heavily subjected to France's policy of assimilation. I also hope it will clear away some of the current misconceptions about French assimilation and its effects on Africans.

000 Many people have helped, often unwittingly, in the creation of this book. I have acknowledged written sources in a detailed bibliography at the end of the book and I have marked with an asterisk those on which I have drawn particularly heavily. Much of my material was obtained in conversation and I am afraid it would be impossible to thank all those who have helped me in this respect. I am, however, particularly indebted to the following: M. Raymond Mauny, M. Ly Abdoulaye, M. André Hauser, M. Yves Mersadier and M. Diop Abdoulaye of the Institut Français d'Afrique Noire at the University of Dakar; M. Galou Fall, M. Guy Etscheverry, and M. Alain Kocher of the Ministry of Information; of the British Embassy, H. E. Mr. Adam Watson and Mr. Tim Brierley who lent

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[115]

Above all I should like to thank Mr. William Foltz of the Department of Political Studies, Yale University, who was in Dakar making a study of the Mali Federation and who not only read this book for publication and made many helpful criticisms, but also gave me much valuable material when we met in Senegal; and finally M. Léopold Wade of the Senegalese Embassy in Lagos, and Mr. Akin Mabogunje of the University College, Ibudan who read the manuscript and offered me much useful advice.

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
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Diourbel
Vallée du Ferlo
Kaolack
Saloum
Falémé
CASAMANCE
Ziguinchor
The Quatre Communes are shown thus. ⊙

SENEGAL

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I. INTRODUCTION

> As far as the majority of Frenchmen are concerned, men are born and remain free and equal before the law. Taking this principle further than its immediate implications, the French tend, with regard to the people of their overseas territories, towards assimilation. 000
>
> J. Richard-Molard

WRITERS on the colonial history of Tropical Africa have usually characterised the French as pursuing a policy of direct rule and political assimilation. These two features have always been stressed in any comparison with British rule in West Africa, which has always been strongly anti-assimilationist and guided by Lord Lugard's theories on indirect rule through existing indigenous institutions. In practice neither colonial power kept, or was able to keep, strictly to its avowed policy; and just as the British found it impossible to impose a system of indirect rule on the peoples of Eastern Nigeria, where traditionally there were no chiefs but democratic organisation at the village level, so too the French found themselves relying frequently on traditional rulers in the administration of their territories and unable to apply a policy of assimilation to nomads or people who had hardly emerged from the Stone Age. Whatever the defects of either theory in practice, it remains true that the French had as their goal, however distant, the cultural and political integration of their colonial peoples, just as Britain, particularly in West Africa, always had as her ulitmate aim the preparation of her colonies for self-government and independence. 648

French assimilation is based on the revolutionary doctrine of the equality of man and at the same time on the assumption of the superiority of European, and in particular

648 French, civilisation. Thus the French, when confronted with people they considered barbarians, believed it their mission to convert them into Frenchmen. This implied a fundamental acceptance of their potential human equality, but a total dismissal of African culture as of any value. Africans were considered to be a people without history, without any civilisation worthy of the name, constantly at war with one another and fortunate to have been put in touch with the fruits of French civilisation. Thus French books describe the French conquest of Africa as 'la paix française' and her early administration as 'l'oeuvre civilisatrice'.

Direct rule was a necessary adjunct of a policy of assimilation for in so far as the French relied on the traditional chiefs, so far did they preserve the traditional social structure of the societies they were administering and this made it more difficult to assimilate them to French standards. Nevertheless where chiefs had great traditional authority, the French found it in practice impossible to use them as mere 'agents' of the administration, and were often forced to adopt a more empirical approach to the problem, particularly in the northern sector of the French Cameroons. The successful application of direct rule was further complicated by the size of the areas the administration had to cover and often, if only as a temporary measure, the traditional authority in these areas had to be used if government were to be maintained. Indeed such were the problems of administering so vast an area as French West Africa that the famous French colonial administrator, Lyautey, came to very much the same conclusions as his contemporary, Lugard, about the problems of native administration in Africa. Lyautey also represented a strong strand in French political theory which was opposed to the assimilation of colonial peoples.

On the other hand Harmand, in his *Domination et colonisation*, written in 1910, whilst generally attacking the application of assimilation in Asia, advocated it for Africa where, he believed—as did most of his contemporaries—there was no indigenous culture worthy of the name. 648

It was not only the practical problems involved that hampered the full application of an assimilationist policy in Africa. French rule in Africa has been just as much a mixture of authoritarianism and liberalism as it has been ever since the Revolution in France. Some of the so-called liberal regimes were effectively reactionary, whilst some of the authoritarian regimes initiated liberal reforms. This curious mixture has been put most succinctly by Robert Delavignette, a colonial administrator of great experience, when he writes in *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*:

> And the Europe of the Revolution and that of the *antien régime*, far from fighting each other in Africa, worked together on the same task. The young cavalry officer, De la Tour Saint-Ygest, who perhaps left France because he could not stand the Revolutionary equality there, went off to Upper Senegal-Niger to destroy the feudal power of the Tuareg, the principles and sentiments of which he cherished. On the other hand, the man who wielded the power of the Republic at Dakar, adherent of a French Freemason lodge, and member of the Radical-Socialist party, was to become in Africa a governor fanatically attached to old style hierarchy, using autocratic methods to lead the natives along the path of progress.

The French never really faced the full implications of assimilation and in practice remarkably little was done to bring into effect the official policy that all colonial peoples should become French and have all the rights of French citizens, which implies that there should have been a very substantial coloured representation in the metropolitan institutions. Thus in 1921, twenty years after France had established her rule throughout French West Africa, the vast mass of the population still had the inferior status of *sujet*, that is they were subject to summary administrative justice and the corvée or forced labour and had no political rights. Ivory Coast had only 308 inhabitants with the 648 641

648 641 privileges of French citizens; Dahomey, 121; Upper Volta, 17; Niger, 9. As late as 1936 out of a total population of fifteen million in French West Africa there were only [633] 2,136 French citizens, with the exception of the citizens of the Four Towns or *Quatre Communes* of Senegal. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff in their book *French West Africa* have suggested that this was because at that time 'the advantages conferred by naturalisation obviously did not compensate in the eyes of the great majority of Africans for acceptance of French law in regard to marriage and inheritance, and for the general shaping of their lives according to the European pattern'. This was only half the 648 truth. Just as important a factor was the sparseness of facilities for education, the keystone to a successful assimilationist policy. As late as 1947 only 1.3 per cent of [871] children of school age in Guinea were actually attending school. In Soudan the figure was higher at 5 per cent, Dahomey 10 per cent and Senegal 12.4 per cent.

In each case Senegal is the exception. Senegal sent a deputy to the French Assembly as early as 1848. Her first indigenous deputy, Blaise Diagne, elected in 1914, became Under Secretary of State for the Colonies on several occasions before his death in 1934. But the other territories of French black Africa did not elect deputies until 1946, though they sent representatives to the Constituent Congress 648 641 in 1945. In 1848 the privileges of French citizenship were granted to all Senegalese living in the Colony, though they [671] were allowed to retain their private law in matters of land, inheritance, marriage and divorce. It was only in 1946 with the passing of the *loi Lamine Guèye* that the privileges of citizenship were granted to Africans other than those who obtained naturalisation, which involved accepting French 648 [633] [646] private law. In Senegal, the towns of St. Louis and Gorée were created *communes de pleins exercices* or full scale municipal councils in 1872 and seven years later a General Council on the lines of those operating in the French departments was established.

established. Until recent years Senegal was the only territory with an educational system in any way compatible with a policy of assimilation. 6A8

Thus, with the exception of Senegal, there evolved a mixed policy containing elements of assimilation and separation which came to be known as the policy of association. Even so, as Lord Hailey wrote in his recent *African Survey*, 'the underlying assumption remained that, on a long view, the future of the overseas territories must be one of eventual integration with France in a larger political unit'. And though assimilationist policy was never really successful on the political level, on the personal level, particularly in education where equality of black and white was so frequently demonstrated, it left deep marks. To quote Lord Hailey once again, this time from his 1939 *African Survey*, 'it is not easy to exaggerate the effect on native outlook of a system which permits Africans to sit side by side with French children and to compete with them on equal terms in examinations'.

Since assimilation was only practised in any real measure in Senegal, it is the most interesting of all the French African colonies as the one most marked by contact with the metropolitan power. This book is therefore a study of Senegal with particular reference to a special kind of race relations whereby one people, whilst accepting the fundamental equality of the other, attempts to assimilate it to its own standards in every sphere of life. An attempt will be made to assess to what extent French assimilation was successful in Senegal and why the Senegalese eventually reacted against it; the subsequent marks it was to leave on this newly independent state; the extent to which indigenous culture withstood assimilationist policy; and finally what sort of society the Senegalese, now independent of France, are trying to create for themselves. 121

Senegal becomes even more interesting as a present day case study. For in applying their policy of assimilation, the French Government had to remember that Senegal was the [563]

121 only black African territory where there was a sizeable
563 French community. In Dakar alone the French numbered
[160] 6,600 in 1931, 17,300 in 1948 and increased to nearly
30,000 in recent years. It is interesting to examine how the
colons on the spot reacted to the acceptance of Africans as
[369] equals in law and political rights and finally how far
assimilation, by providing a new common culture, was able
to break down traditional indigenous inter-ethnic hostilities.

II. FRENCH ASSIMILATION IN PRACTICE

> **. . . that France above all should understand this great mission which the Lord has entrusted to her . . . by sending missions composed of men of clear courage and integrity and of superior intelligence . . . to serve as intermediaries and interpreters between these more or less savage people on the one hand and the civilisation and institutions of Europe on the other . . .** 000
>
> **Heinrich Barth**

In a few short words the great German explorer Heinrich Barth summed up the ideals of French assimilationist policy in Africa. But as we have seen these ideals were to be tempered not only by the realities of colonial administration but also by the failure of the French ever to accept the full implications of an assimilationist policy. Nowhere was this clearer than in Senegal, where France carried out in one part of the country what may be described in terms of nineteenth-century colonial administration as a very advanced policy of assimilation whilst subjecting the rest of the country to an authoritarian rule unknown in British West Africa. 648

Senegal came into contact with the French in the early seventeenth century when French commercial companies started trading at the mouth of the river Senegal, first entered by Europeans in 1445. In 1659 Caullier founded the town of St. Louis on an island at the mouth of the river. For the rest of the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century, the fort he built there, around which grew up a prosperous trading town dominated by the great chartered companies, was to be the centre of French commercial activity on the west coast of Africa. 175 [439]

Though the French did explore the Senegal river and even established a fort at Podor in 1745, they had no control of the hinterland; their sphere of influence was strictly limited to the island on which St. Louis was built and to the

175 small island of Gorée further down the coast. However this
did not mean that the French lacked interest in the interior.
From 1749-53 Michel Adanson explored the Senegalese
coast and undertook the first really scientific description of
West Africa. His writings were largely responsible for the
later hope that European colonisation of this part of Africa
would be possible. But for the rest of the eighteenth century
France's hold on St. Louis was too tenuous for anything of
this nature to be undertaken. Indeed during the Seven
Years' War the town fell to the British and was only returned
175 in 1779. By the end of the eighteenth century St. Louis
563 with a population of 7,000, had a European colony number-
ing 600, the largest on the whole of the West Coast. It also
369 had an important assimilated mulatto community, whose
[162] descendants are known today as St. Louisiens. Indeed there
had been a very high degree of *métissage* by the end of the
eighteenth century, since most Frenchmen there took
permanent African mistresses known as *signares*, and ensured
the education of any children they had by them. Indeed
in all but legal status these *signares* were wives and their
'marriages' were celebrated by their families with all the
pomp of a normal wedding. However, with the improve-
ment of communications between Senegal and France and
the arrival of larger numbers of soldiers in the middle of
the nineteenth century, mistresses were much more tempor-
ary in nature and the number of Frenchmen prepared to
educate resulting offspring was considerably reduced.

175 In 1789 St. Louis sent its *cahier* of grievances to the States-
567 General on the eve of the French Revolution, demanding
the end of the monopoly of the great companies, freedom of
[439] trade and the abolition of slavery, which had hitherto formed
the main item of export from St. Louis. These grievances
were heeded. Slavery was abolished and the companies
had their charters withdrawn. But the position of slaves
and slave-trading in the colonies was not in fact settled until
the end of the wars that followed the French Revolution.

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648 During these wars St. Louis once again fell to the British

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S
and only under the terms of the Treaty of Paris which ended 648
the Napoleonic Wars was it finally returned to the French [175]
in 1817. Under King Louis XVIII, France embarked on a
policy of European colonisation of Senegal. Colonel S W
Schmaltz negotiated with Moctar Diop, the Lebou chief 648
of the small village of Dakar, for land to settle 200 emigrants
to be despatched from France under the auspices of the
Société Coloniale Philanthropique. But climate and disease
soon put an end to this venture. Nevertheless Schmaltz
persisted with his schemes in St. Louis so that Senegal could
by its products enrich the mother country. He made agreements
with local chiefs for the agricultural settlement of
part of the Oualo or hinterland of St. Louis and in 1819
a model farm was established to experiment in the growing of S
cotton, olives, dates, coconuts and coffee. This policy was 648
pursued enthusiastically by his successor, Baron Roger,
and a number of experiments, mainly concerned with
cotton, were undertaken in the next few years. By 1822
nearly fifty concessions had been granted to the French by
local chiefs and for the next five years further experiments
were carried out by Monsieur Richard who started a full
scale research station at what is now called Richard-Toll
or Richard's field. But his efforts were not crowned with
success, and later governors influenced by the reaction against
colonialism in France lost interest in agricultural settlement.
This was perhaps fortunate for modern Senegal,
since had these first experiments been fruitful she might
have been saddled with a settler problem today.

France was already working towards an assimilationist
policy. A governmental despatch to Schmaltz informed
him that his political aim should be 'to introduce gradually
among the blacks of Senegal a civilisation based on free
labour . . . education, and public peace . . .' It continued: S
'A mulatto is now mayor of the capital of our possessions, [563]
and a black could become so too.' Two years later Baron
Roger was informed that since most of the free population [369]
of St. Louis was mulatto or African it was 'very important

648 not to let the same discriminations and prejudices such as
[563] exist in other colonies be introduced among them.' At
[369] the same time the metropolitan Government was asking
whether Africans would make suitable corporals and under-officers. Furthermore Schmaltz, whilst advocating a system of economic exploitation that seemed to be entirely to the advantage of France, maintained that the Senegalese were not merely to be auxiliaries and that they would be encouraged by fixed prices for their crops to produce more and become 'civilised' by their contact with Europe.

648 So far France had made no definition of the position of
567 non-French inhabitants of her colonies. Even though France
641 by the decree of 16 Pluviose Year II (1792) had abolished
slavery and declared that 'all men, without distinction of colour, domiciled in French colonies, are French citizens, and enjoy all the rights assured by the Constitution', and even though the slave trade had been outlawed in 1818, until 1833 freed slaves had uncertain status in law, and domestic slaves still existed in large numbers. A royal ordinance of that year proclaimed that 'Any person born free or having legally acquired his liberty enjoys in the French colonies: (1) civil rights; (2) political rights under conditions prescribed by law'. But only in 1848 was the status of *captif* or domestic slave abolished, though the majority of *captifs* continued to serve with their former masters. Naturally this law only affected inhabitants of St. Louis and Gorée and the other French posts like Dagana and Richard-Toll.

648 The most important result of these two laws was to give
[641] about 12,000 Africans, mostly illiterate, the full rights of
[818] French citizens. Of these less than a thousand had been
[799] converted to Christianity by their French, mulatto or
Christian African masters. Educational facilities, which would have to accompany any effective conversion of illiterates into full scale French citizens were still rudimentary. But it must be remembered that in France, at the time, the electorate was suddenly increased from 200,000 to

9,000,000 most of whom were illiterate. Balzac, in 1845, wrote in his book *Les paysans*: 648

> For twenty million beings in France the law is merely a piece of white paper stuck on the door of the Church or the Town Hall . . . Many mayors of cantons turn their copies of the *Bulletin des Lois* into bags for holding raisins and seeds. As for the mere mayors of communes you would be shocked by the number who cannot read or write and by the way in which the civil registers are kept.

Most remarkable of the innovations of the short lived French Second Republic of 1848-52, in which the Revolution once more came into its own, was the granting of the right to Senegal of sending a deputy to the National Assembly in France. Grandly it was announced, 'The Colonies purified of slavery . . . will be represented in the National Assembly'. Effectively, such a deputy would be representing an overwhelming majority of African 'citizens' for metropolitan Frenchmen numbered then only some 500. However it was to take some time before the African citizens were to use this newly acquired right to elect one of their own number to the Assembly. [162] [563] [666]

The 1848 Revolution thus embroidered on the 1833 ordinance of the French monarchy by introducing a full scale assimilationist policy for the colonies of France. In Senegal it affected only a small number of people. And never again would France in her expansion through Africa apply this trend in her colonial policy so liberally to her newly acquired territories. Thereafter there was to be a tussle with those administrators who either felt that the inhabitants of the colonial territories were different and should be treated as such, or were overwhelmed by the practical problems involved in applying an assimilationist policy to a largely illiterate population spread over an area eight times the size of France.

The reaction to the liberal thinking of the second republic soon came with Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* by which an authoritarian Second Empire was established. In 1854 the right of electing a deputy was withdrawn from all

648 colonies other than Martinique, Guadeloupe and Réunion
and at the same time they were subjected to rule by direct
decree of the Emperor.

[167] It was under the Second Empire that the first great period
of French colonial expansion in black Africa took place. It
was during that regime that Faidherbe, who was to Senegal
what Lugard was to Nigeria, first embarked on his African
conquests. Faidherbe himself embodied this dichotomy in
French colonial policy: an authoritarian agent of an
authoritarian regime, he was often found introducing
reforms and innovations that conformed with the most
liberal application of an assimilationist policy.

[643] Faidherbe was appointed Governor of Senegal in 1854.
369 At the time St. Louis, according to Abbé Boilaut in his
[162] *Esquisses sénégalaises* was a city of 12,336 inhabitants with
[563] only 177 Europeans. There were two primary schools run
[872] by Catholic missionaries. A full scale administration had
[797] succeeded in imposing on a town otherwise consisting mainly
[361] of single storey houses, a governor's palace, a 'very elegant
Palace of Justice', a large naval hospital, a fine church and
an army barracks.

648 From his base at St. Louis, Faidherbe, in a series of
643 brilliant campaigns, notably against the powerful emir of
Trarza and the Muslim reformist and Toucouleur leader,
El Hadj Omar, was to lay the foundations of France's West
African empire. To do this he organised the now famous
Tirailleurs Sénégalais, since Europeans did not stand up well
to the climate and the prevalent diseases. By conquest or by
treaty he brought most of modern Senegal and much of
643 Soudan (Mali) under French rule. He installed an efficient
military administration, and even published an official
[804] newspaper the *Moniteur du Sénégal*. Altogether Faidherbe
was a remarkable man. He was a firm believer in the
equality of races, and did much to increase the educational
[871] facilities of the colony. He established a school for the sons
[797] of chiefs, and lay schools for Muslims, who objected to
attending the mission schools. Whilst Faidherbe wanted to

encourage the evangelisation of the population, he[1] was 643 sufficiently knowledgeable about the country and its people [997] to realise that it would be impossible to win converts from among the Muslims who formed the majority in Senegal. Scholarships for primary education in St. Louis, and secondary [871] education in France were awarded under his auspices to promising students. Small technical schools were established at Dakar. And he even opened a museum at St. Louis.

He tried to equip the colony with some of the benefits of a modern economy. He established the Bank of Senegal, [453] laid out St. Louis afresh as befitted a capital city, and under his influence Pinet-Laprade founded the new port of Dakar. [369] He promoted the export of the ground-nut crop, becoming [439] increasingly valuable to the colony's revenue which rose from 12 million francs in 1848 to 37 million in 1869, and [433] proved a profitable substitute for human merchandise. He made valuable and detailed studies of the local people. Like Lugard he seemed to be able to think of every aspect of administration at the same time. The historian G. Hardy wrote of him: 'He touched on everything, and always with good results.' But as J. Richard-Molard commented, 'He was the first great Frenchman to realise the wish of Barth. But he did it as an officer of the Empire, endowed with an abominable character and a sense of authority which bordered on vice. He was proconsul of an authoritarian Empire.'

One decision vital for the future of the Senegal was made 648 during the Faidherbian regime: this was the final abandonment of any ideals of European colonisation. It came at a time when the French were settling Algeria, and was not altogether altruistic, as the ministerial instructions of 1859 showed:

> Nothing similar to Algeria could be undertaken in Senegal. The climate is against it. The land should therefore be left to the natives, at least as a general rule. It is by their hands that it should be cultivated and if our rule is to be extended over all the territory

[1] [i.e., Faidherbe, who became Governor in 1854--Analyst]

648 that belongs to us, our occupation should be limited to those parts necessary for assuring the suppression of brigandage, the freedom of trade and the tranquillity of an industrious population.

The land cultivated by them will provide produce which will become the object of lucrative trade for the European, the only kind of work he can undertake in this climate.

648 641 161 160 563 By 1865 the colony of Senegal comprised 150,000 inhabitants of whom only some 15,000, living in the original French settlements of St. Louis and Gorée-Dakar, were French citizens. Indeed this number was not to increase noticeably until the end of the century, since the privileges granted to those Africans under French rule in 1848 were never extended to the interior. For whilst Faidherbe pursued a policy of assimilation in the main centres like St. Louis, Gorée and Dakar, he initiated the basis of a system of administration for what was to become the rest of modern Senegal and French black Africa as a whole that was distinctly non-assimilationist. The laws for the *sujets* or those who did not enjoy the rights of French citizens were partic-
167 466 653 631 ularly harsh. They were not allowed to leave the colony, they had no right of meeting or association, and they were subjected to the corvée or forced labour on the maintenance of roads. To obtain this forced labour Faidherbe relied on the chiefs, and indeed one of the main criticisms of him as an exponent of assimilationism is that he leaned so heavily on both the chiefs and Islam. The treaty made by Jauréguiberry (acting-Governor whilst Faidherbe was on leave in 1865) with Abdoul Boubaker of Toro was far removed from the principles of assimilation: 'Art. 2—The Toro will continue to administer itself according to its own laws, traditions and customs.'

The overthrow of the Second Empire and the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870 was to see lukewarm reaffirmation of principles of the revolution and a consequent return to assimilationist principles at least in the
646 political field. In 1871 Senegal regained her deputy. More

important still a Conseil-Général equivalent to the Conseils- 641
Généraux of the French department but with much greater 648
financial autonomy was established for the colony. However 646
representation was limited to citizens of the colony and not the great majority of *sujets* of the Protectorate. This spurt
of assimilation was completed a year later when privileges 633
of local self-government were granted to St. Louis and 641
Gorée which were created *communes de pleine exercice*. In 1880 the prosperous new port of Rufisque, some fifteen miles from modern Dakar, was also accorded these privileges, and in 1887 Dakar was separated from Gorée and also gained them.

This was as far as assimilation was to go politically 648
in either Senegal or the rest of French West Africa. Not 641
until 1944 was there any extension of political rights in French black Africa. Indeed in Senegal the citizens had to fight to retain their privileges against an administration that came increasingly to regret the privileges it had granted the Senegalese in the first fine flush of colonial expansion in Black Africa. Thus until the outbreak of the Second World War one had the paradoxical situation of the French regretting their assimilationist policy and the Senegalese citizens asking that it be applied more liberally. This is one of the main reasons why the activities of French Africans, particularly in Senegal, were channelled not towards the attainment of independence but the assertion of their fundamental equality with the French. Their energies were for long directed to obtaining from the French those rights which in principle an assimilationist policy offered them.

III. FRENCH REACTION AGAINST ASSIMILATION

000 France had made a great mistake in granting suffrage to the Natives. She did not withdraw her present, but took good care not to repeat it elsewhere.

PIERRE MILLE: *The Black Vote in Senegal.*

648 UNTIL 1913 all the Senegalese deputies in the French Chamber of Deputies were citizens of metropolitan origin. And in the General Council and the municipal
646 [633] [563] councils Europeans, even when they were not in a majority, more often than not succeeded in controlling proceedings. With this European domination of the representative institutions, it may come as a surprise that France not only failed to extend the experiment to other parts of French Africa, but indeed did her best to suppress those rights already granted in Senegal. First of all many of the Gover-
643 646 [652] nors resented the control the General Council had over the territorial budget, albeit limited. Secondly they found that the General Council tried to run a peace-time administration for that part of Senegal under direct rule, whilst the Governors were more concerned with the pacification of the much larger hinterland, for in those days Senegal included much of what is now Mali. As one historian of Senegal, André Villard, has put it: 'The Colony thought it had the right to lead the quiet life of a French *arrondissement* at the very time when expansion towards the east necessitated exceptional political and military efforts.' An authoritarian Governor like Brière de l'Isle found it particularly galling to be saddled with a democratically
646 563 633 elected legislative council. Furthermore the General-Councillors, who were mainly European or half-caste up

till the end of the nineteenth century, neglected the Protectorate 646
and seemed to think that the only parts of the 563
country that mattered were the four communes. Naturally 633
their official business with the Protectorate was limited, but
they did control the three main ports of the country through [439]
which the products of the interior passed to France. The 646
councillors, too, restricted education largely to the communes, 871
where on the whole it reached a satisfactory level.
They even sent students on scholarships to France, but [369]
unfortunately too few of these returned to Senegal to use
their newly acquired talents. It was not until the establishment
of the Government-General of French West Africa
in 1905 that educational facilities were extended to the [648]
Protectorate in any great measure.

The increase in education amongst citizens of African 641
origin meant that by the turn of the nineteenth century they
were less willing to accept European domination in the
communes and the General Council. The assertion of their
rights is one of the main factors behind the attempts of the
administration to deprive the indigenous Senegalese of their
position as *citoyens*. Actually the Administration was batting
on a good wicket. Technically a French citizen was one who
accepted French rights and duties without qualification.
In the case of the Africans in Senegal they had been allowed [671]
to retain their own *statut personnel*, that is private law, with
reference to civil disputes, matrimony, divorce, inheritance
and land. But this seemed to conflict openly with the
definition of a French citizen. It seemed wrong that a
man should exercise the rights of a French citizen and not
accept the consequent obligations. Many Frenchmen felt
it quite illogical that an African with four wives could yet
be a citizen. And indeed in later years the main obstacle
to granting citizenship to other colonial peoples was to be
the question of retention of the *statut personnel*. Thus many
of the attempts by the French to deprive the Senegalese
citizens of their rights were the result of quite genuine
objections to the illogicality of their position. Faidherbe, [643]

Faidherbe,
643 writing in 1889, protested against this attitude since he felt
641 that to make monogamy a condition of citizenship would
break up families and that monogamy should be achieved by
education. But more potent were those forces which disliked
the exercise of such rights by a small African minority, albeit
linked with Europeans, which could so often obstruct not
only the Governor of Senegal but the Governor-General
himself, since until 1904 these two were one and the same
man. The existence of a vocal General Council and
Municipal Councils, let alone a deputy in France, which
could all express opinions directly hostile to the authoritarian
rule of the Governor, was another important factor behind
the moves to deprive the Senegalese of their citizenship
at the end of the nineteenth century. There was also
666 however quite genuine concern at the way in which the vote
641 was exercised in Senegal. Pierre Mille, in an article entitled
The Black Vote in Senegal published in 1901, alleged that the
African voters, mainly illiterate, were controlled by the
handful of Europeans who bought their votes. He went so
far as to describe Senegal as a 'rotten borough'. Indeed he
alleged that the expense of the election absorbed a large
part of the colony's finances: and further that after competing
against each other for the electors' favour, the big
companies in Senegal finally decided to combine the
operation to save expenses and control Senegal to their
641 mutual advantage. But as to the virtue of the Senegalese
as citizens in other respects Mille was surprisingly warm:
[595] 'Having become French citizens and notwithstanding that
they were Muslims, they, with a few exceptions, accepted
monogamy . . . and they have spread far and wide in Africa
the renown and justice of French administration'. But as
Mille concluded, this was not sufficient to persuade France
648 to continue the experiment in her other West African
colonies. Indeed, confirming what has already been said
about empirical tendencies in French colonial rule, by
1900, when France had gained most of her vast African
empire, Mille commented that it was 'administered with an

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

interesting suppleness under the most diverse conditions 648
according to the state of civilisation or submission—or
lack of submission—of the natives'.

As a reaction against the powers of the Senegalese General 648
Council during the regrouping of the French West African 646
territories the Protectorate, with the exception of Casa- [633]
mance, Thiès, Cayor and Tivaouane and the *cercles* of the
Fleuve, was detached from the colony of Senegal so that
the General Council could not legitimately interfere in its
affairs. However two years later economic and administra-
tive exigencies decreed the reshaping of Senegal and the rest
of French Africa into the territorial boundaries that exist
today.

The first major attempt to undermine the rights of the 641
Senegalese with the rights of citizens by virtue of being born 633
in one of the four communes, known as *originaires*, came in
1908 when the Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal asked that
1,563 names be struck off the electoral role of Dakar arguing
that since the natives concerned were only French subjects
they could not vote. Only French citizens could vote, and
citizenship could be obtained only by individual naturalis-
ation. This was upheld in the local court but rejected by the [692]
Cour de Cassation in Paris. However, the Court confirmed
that these voters were not French citizens though they
maintained that they had the right to vote. This failure
to recognise their status as citizens evoked much ill-feeling
among the *originaires*. In 1910 the voting rights in the
Senegal were in fact extended when it was provided that
French citizens living outside the communes but within
the colony could vote. But the Minister of Colonies declared
that the decree did not apply to 'non-naturalised natives
who only enjoy the franchise in the four *communes de pleine
exercice* on condition of being born there', and thus once
again emphasised the fact that the French Government did
not consider the *originaires* as true citizens. Indeed in the
following year their position was further aggravated when [701]
originaires doing their military service in metropolitan units

641 of the army in West Africa, and serving on the same basis
633 as European citizens, were suddenly discharged without
[701] reason. A commission of the General Council asked that in future all voters, without distinction of colour, be called on to perform their obligatory military service. Thus by 1912 one had the odd spectacle of Africans, far from trying to avoid military service, insisting on their right to perform it on the grounds that only thus could they secure their rights as French citizens.

However French intransigence over the question of the *originaires* was made clear in the Naturalisation Decree of 1912, which stated that only French subjects born in West Africa could acquire French citizenship. The conditions for acquisition of citizenship were: having proved devotion to France or having occupied with merit for at least ten years a position in a French office, public or private; having learned to read or write French; having given evidence of possessing a means of existence and good character. As a result between 1914-22 only ninety-four natives in French West Africa were naturalised. Those who were defined as
692 subject to the jurisdiction of the native, instead of the
641 French, tribunals were all those natives 'who had not had in
633 their country of origin the status of European national'. This was interpreted by the *originaires* as an attempt to remove from them their right to appear before French tribunals and subject them to administrative justice like the sujets of the Protectorate, for whilst they were anxious to retain their right to their *statut personnel* in civil matters such as marriage and inheritance, they wanted to be tried in French courts in criminal cases. This evoked furious criticisms by the *originaires* and Maître Lamine Guèye, himself an *originaire* and later Deputy in the French Assembly, wrote 'Our fears were more than justified by the spectacle of what happened in the interior of the Colony, where administrators, reviving in certain respects feudal practices, imposed on the persons of our compatriots of the protectorate acts which were neither human nor French'.

Such was the outcry against this decree that a further decree 633
in 1914 confirmed that 'all natives born in the four communes 641
would be subject to French tribunals throughout [692]
the colony and in certain other places'. Indeed Lamine
Guèye was one of the most ardent critics of France for her
failure to accord the full rights of an assimilationist policy
to the *originaires*. He protested against the way the Government
opposed 'the entrance of all natives of whatever
status they may be, into the general administrative services,
even into military units stationed in the colony'. It was
only by insistence on the right to do military service on [701]
equal terms with the French that the *originaires* were finally
able to gain confirmation of their rights as citizens. In
1914 Blaise Diagne became the first Senegalese to sit in the
Chamber of Deputies. He won his seat partly as a result [666]
of the split vote amongst his six European opponents,
partly because he appealed to the Senegalese voters by his
demands for complete equality between black and white.
His particular platform was a pledge to vote for a law for 633
obligatory military service without distinction of race or 641
colour. In a letter to the Minister of Colonies he said the 701
originaires did not want the privileges without the obligations
of French citizenship. At the time, of course, France was
just about to enter into the Great War and badly needed
troops from Africa. Thus without much difficulty a law was
passed providing for the conscription of the *originaires* as
French troops. In return for Diagne's co-operation in
recruiting troops for the war effort, the Government passed
the Citizenship Law of 1916 which once and for all confirmed
the status of the *originaires*. They could retain their *statut* [671]
personnel and need not understand French to be considered
as citizens. 'The natives of the *communes de pleine exercice*
and their descendants are and remain French citizens
subject to the military obligations of the Law of 19 October
1915.' The rider about the status of 'descendants' was of
particular importance to Lamine Guèye who was born in
Soudan of *originaire* parents.

641 648 [643] An interesting sidelight on the confused French attitude towards assimilation and Africans was the status accorded to Blaise Diagne as Commissioner of the Republic in charge of conscription of troops in West Africa. He was given rank equal to that of the Governor-General, Van Vollenhoven, who thereat resigned. However this is only one side of the story. The French insist that he resigned because he felt that the large number of troops to be recruited would wreck the colony's economy and severely reduce the indigenous population. Nevertheless the presence of an African deputy for Senegal was not viewed well in all quarters. But Diagne could not be tempted by high office outside the parliamentary sphere and won a resounding victory in the 1919 elections [666] with 7,444 votes to his opponent's 1,252. He was then appointed Under Secretary of States for Colonies. His essential attachment to France was clear, for whilst in 1919 he became President of the Pan-African Congress, which urged that ultimately 'Africa should be ruled by consent of the Africans . . .' he refused, as Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff have pointed out 'to support any revolutionary theories as to the emancipation of all Negro peoples'. 'We French natives', he said, 'wish to remain French, since France has given us every liberty'.

646 633 The French were still not happy about the position of the *originaires* and in 1920, not so much from a show of liberalism as from a desire to reduce the pressures exercised on the Administration by the twenty-member General Council, it was translated into a Colonial Council with an increased membership of forty-four of which twenty were sent by the hitherto unrepresented Protectorate. The representatives [631] of the *sujets*, who were provincial or cantonal chiefs, could be relied on to vote with the Administration whose agents they were, and thus reduce the independence of the communes. In 1925, however, the number of chiefs was reduced to sixteen and the citizens' representatives increased to twenty-four as a means of persuading them to vote larger

taxes, but thereafter relations between chiefs and Govern- 646
ment on the one hand and citizens on the other were rarely [633]
cordial. [631]

The powers of the Council were very restricted, having
legislative rights over minor matters like the classification
of roads and the management of public properties. Even
these limited powers were subject to the veto of the [648]
Governor-General of French West Africa. Its main deliber-
ative competence was over the budget, which though drawn [652]
up by the Governor could be criticised by the councillors.
This power was watered down by the classification of a [643]
large section of the budget as obligatory expenditure.
Nevertheless the council was an exceptional institution
in West Africa. As R. L. Buell in his *The Native Problem in Africa* wrote:

> That the eight Europeans who participated in the Council should 563
> have exactly the same status as the thirty-two blacks is a situation 646
> which would strike the Anglo-Saxon as anomalous to say the least. The visitor to the Council will frequently witness a black president calling a European member to order for rowdiness. It does not appear, however, that the council is divided upon racial lines, i.e. of white versus black, except on the issue of higher pay for European officials—a policy which was, in fact, attacked as vigorously by the Europeans as by the native members. The real alignment so far has been the citizen members—both black and European—against the government supported by the chiefs. Black members as we have seen, have unmercifully criticised officials in Senegal. No British colony would tolerate the attacks which the natives make upon European officials in Senegal.

Buell pin-pointed a growing division in the territory— 641
that between the *originaires* and the *sujets* of the Protectorate.
The *originaires*, especially since the election of one of their
own number as deputy, became increasingly jealous of their
privileges. Meanwhile the rest of the territory was adminis-
tered according to the same principles of administration as
were applied throughout the rest of West Africa. Though [631]
traditional chiefs were stripped of their traditional powers

641 they were made agents of the Administration and responsi-
[631] ble for the enforcement of the corvée when required. The
harshness of this authoritarian rule, escaped only by the
évolués in the other territories, has been vividly described
by Geoffrey Gorer in *Africa Dances*, which records a long
tour made through French West Africa in the mid-thirties.
Even so in 1930 France had signed the Geneva Act for-
[466] bidding forced labour in the colonies; but it was slow to
disappear. In 1937 the right to form trade unions, which
[467] hitherto was only granted to Senegalese citizens by a law of
1920, was extended in a restricted form to the *sujets*. That
same year a new decree allowed easier conditions for the
acquisition of French citizenship by the *sujets*. Out of a
population of 1,800,000 in 1936 there were 78,000 citizens
compared with some 2,400 in the rest of French West
Africa. And in 1939 the *sujets* were granted the right of
[666] electing some of their representatives to the Colonial
Council instead of being represented only by nominees of
the Administration.

641 This newly acquired right was enjoyed for a very brief
648 period. For in 1940 the authoritarian element in France
came to the fore in particularly unhappy circumstances with the fall of France and the establishment of the Vichy Government. Under the Vichy regime, racism manifested itself openly for the first time. This was particularly embittering for the Senegalese élite since they had been much in sympathy with the Popular Front Government which attempted liberal experiments in Algeria and Syria. All Senegalese representative institutions were suppressed. Priority was given to Europeans in rationed goods and in many other spheres. Liberty of association was withdrawn from both races, and whilst European members of the resistance were rarely hanged, Africans themselves rarely escaped the supreme penalty. By contrast in France the future President of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was fighting in the French resistance and was later interned in a German concentration camp.

Senegal had never in fact been free from elements of 641
racism, though such a policy was never officially countenanced 648
until the Vichy regime. Geoffrey Gorer found many instances of discrimination in Dakar, and actually went as far as to say that 'The colour bar is extremely strong in Dakar'. But he concluded 'these French citizens are far happier than their brother French Negro subjects; if they are too badly cheated or abused they have some redress in the law courts'. The colour bar was certainly not official policy then as it became under the Vichy Administration.

The Vichy regime marks the end of an era in West 648
Africa and particularly in Senegal. Until 1940 there had been little or no opposition to French assimilationist policy by the Africans. Indeed they were the first to criticise any deviations from it. Blaise Diagne enjoyed high status in France, and though he was accused by his critics of corruption and of selling himself to the French he remained the popular choice in Senegal until his death.

At the ensuing election Galandou Diouf defeated Blaise 648
Diagne's old opponent, Lamine Guèye, who was instrumental 665
in the formation of the Senegalese branch of the 662
S.F.I.O. Hitherto elections had been largely fought on the basis of personal followings, with the exception of the European-dominated *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais* founded in 1929 in which Europeans played a prominent role. Not only was Lamine Guèye the first Senegalese to realise the value of the party machine, but he was also the first to [667]
advocate the granting of full political and legal rights to all French Africans. Significantly he did not suggest any [641]
form of break with France, rather that France should carry her assimilationist policy to its logical conclusions. In 1939 he increased his political backing considerably when the *P.S.S.* fused with his section of the *S.F.I.O.* and this was to make him a leading member of the party in the metropolis as well as in Senegal.

However the younger generation of Senegalese were 000

however the younger generation of Senegalese were
648 beginning to question the moral right of assimilation. These
871 critics were the educated élite, by-products of an educational
policy of which Governor-General Chaudié had written
571 in 1897: 'The school is the surest means of action by which a civilising nation can transmit its ideas to people who are still primitive and by which it can raise them gradually to its own standards. In a word the school is the supreme element of progress. It is also the most effective tool of propaganda for the French language that the Government can use.'

Ousmane Socé Diop, in *Karim*, a remarkable study of the sort of young Senegalese most affected by French assimilation, published in 1935, shows not only how effective this policy was in those early days, but also points to the awakening of the Senegalese to the values of their own traditional society.

648 On certain evenings in Dakar, Karim and his young friends would talk not only of love but of their political and
571 social ideas:

> The teacher was there, reasonable, but capable at moments of behaving foolishly, such as over the beautiful eyes of a Senegalese girl. He was a 'progressive', a partisan of a plan of evolution with its basis in the fundamental characteristics of his people.
>
> The graduate, a know-all, spoke of 'cleaning-up Senegalese traditions and of bringing about an immediate and thorough Europeanisation.
>
> The doctor, a Catholic, adopted Western civilisation without question. Nevertheless, his atavistic temperament remained one with that of his own people.
>
> Abdou was born a Muslim and an oriental and had been educated at a French school. His mind had been nurtured on European ideas and logic. His heart had been formed within the curious framework of the *Khalam*, of French poetry and European music. He was a person of contrasts. He could dance to the tam-tam as well as do the tango, he liked Negro music and black girls, but also dreamed of Deauville, of Paris and of some film-starlet, a blonde blue-eyed Venus.

[369] Later Karim is sent out to a small town in the 'bush' where he has to help with the collection of the ground-nut

crop. Struck by the simple, uncomplicated ways of the bush 648
compared with that of Dakar, Rufisque and St. Louis he 571
reflects: 'The teacher and above all the graduate who spoke 369
so often of immediate and complete Europeanisation, should be here to see for themselves.'

Ousmane Socé Diop has pin-pointed perfectly the growing conflict in the minds of the educated Senegalese at this time and the ever increasing gap between the peoples of the *Quatre Communes* and the *sujets* of the bush.

Furthermore the Senegalese student in Paris was beginning to question the rights of colonialism in general and the honesty of France's assimilationist policy in particular. He was hardly encouraged by the pronouncements of a leading politician during the twenties and thirties like Albert Sarraut who wrote in *La mise en valeur de nos colonies* that the colonies had a threefold purpose of serving France. First the numbers of France's overseas peoples increased her population from 40 million to 100 million, thus giving her a greater manpower than Germany. Secondly they could make a financial contribution to France. Thirdly they could supply her with the raw materials she needed. France's civilising mission, whilst important, was conceived of by Sarraut as a by-product of these functions. (Quoted in L. P. Mair, *Native Policies in Africa*.)

As we have seen, assimilationist professions were rarely 571
matched by the facts. And indeed in other parts of French 871
West Africa education was limited. But in Senegal France 648
made a major effort in education, so that by 1940 there had already been formed a substantial African élite, particularly in comparison to the country's population.

By 1938 18,000 boys and 1,500 girls, taught by 132 European and 337 African teachers were at school; even so, a very low percentage of the population of school age actually attended school. Nevertheless this was considerably higher than that of any other French African territory. Children were educated according to French methods with few concessions made to local factors. The aim was not

571 only to civilise them but to make them aware of 'France's
871 achievements' in Africa. Thus, as Lucy Mair has pointed
648 out, history was taught so as to justify French occupation of
West Africa. Several important *lycées* and secondary schools
[873] were founded. The *Lycée Faidherbe* and the *Lycée Van Vollenhoven* were to provide the basis of the modern élite whilst the *Ecole Normale William Ponty* educated many of the present leaders of French-speaking Africa. It was this new generation of educated young men, produced in the late twenties and thirties, that was first to question the virtues of an assimilationist policy both on the political and moral plane.

IV. REFORMS

> **The aims of France's civilising mission accomplished in the colonies rules out any idea of autonomy, any possibility of evolution outside the French empire bloc; the eventual constitution, however remote, of self-government in the colonies is out of the question.** 000
>
> **Brazzaville Conference, 1944**

THE years that followed the fall of Vichy France were to see great changes in the political structure of French Africa. Senegal itself benefited less from these changes than the other African territories, for the main substance of the changes was to bring the other territories constitutionally in line with her. Though two Senegalese deputies, Maître Lamine Guèye and Léopold Sédar Senghor, were to play a leading role in the shaping of the new constitution of the Fourth Republic for France and her overseas territories, the first initiative for change came from the much more backward colonies of French Equatorial Africa, who, unlike the French authorities in Senegal and French West Africa, had never accepted the Vichy regime. 648

At the conference held in Brazzaville in 1944 on the eve of the fall of the Vichy Government to decide the future role of Tropical Africa in a liberated France, the coloured Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, Felix Eboué, one of de Gaulle's most loyal supporters, and who enjoyed immense prestige in French Africa, played the leading part. This conference effectively marks the beginning of modern French African politics, though no African politicians, least of all the experienced Senegalese, participated in it. Characteristically the delegates, mainly colonial administrators, were torn between the ideals of assimilation and the more practical virtues of political and administrative decentralisation.

[p 29]

648 The conference decided that the political future of the colonies should lie with France and ruled out all ideas of eventual independence. They did, however, insist that the colonies should be represented at the constituent Assembly that would draw up the constitution for the Fourth Republic at the end of the war. But they did not consider that the wider representation of Africans in metropolitan institutions would be as beneficial to the African colonies as the establishment of a Federal Assembly for France and its empire. These two suggestions were in tune with traditional integrationist and assimilationist thought, but in addition the delegates made certain proposals that implied considerable administrative and political decentralisation. They asked that assemblies should be set up for each territory, but on the understanding that they should work in close relation to the proposed Federal Assembly and that if possible the franchise should be as wide as practicable for Africans. They also laid down the principle of the dual college, so that Europeans could have effective representation. The administrators of the 'Republic one and Indivisible' were thereby advocating a considerable degree of administrative decentralisation, which in retrospect can be seen as vital to the subsequent achievement of independence by the various states of French black Africa. It was probably fortunate that the conference was one of administrators and not of politicians for their cogent arguments against the inefficiency of the pre-war, highly centralised empire were accepted eventually as directed towards the achievement of a more efficient working of the empire rather than as an attempt to break it up as they certainly might have been had such criticisms come from African politicians. On the other hand the conference made it explicit that decentralisation did not imply independence. All possibility of autonomy outside the French bloc was excluded.

641 The conference* was highly assimilationist in its recommendations
648 for individuals particularly as regards political

871 * [i.e., Brazzaville Conference, 1944--Analyst]

and juridical rights. The old signs of inequality, the 641
indigénat and the hated corvée were to be withdrawn, 648
the latter after a period of five years. Education was to [871]
remain exclusively French, though Eboué put in a plea for
the recognition of the values of traditional society. The
problems of granting French citizenship to Africans without
prejudicing their *statut personnel* was to be solved within the [671]
framework of the proposed Federal Parliament for France
and her overseas territories. Africans would thus have
citizenship of this larger Federation rather than of France
itself and would not therefore have to give up their *statut
personnel*. The new principle was first applied in March
1944. French citizenship was extended to a number of
Muslims in Algeria who were allowed to retain their
statut personnel, on the same terms as the *originaires* of Senegal
had been. Finally the conference proposed a large scale
development programme for the overseas territories.

In the Constituent Assembly which was to deliberate on 648
the constitution of the Fourth Republic, sixty-four seats
were given to overseas deputies, a fair number going to
Africans. Two socialists from Senegal, Lamine Guèye
and his lieutenant Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first African
to become a *professeur agrégé* of the Sorbonne, played a
leading role in the debates of the new constitution, attacking
remnants of Vichy racialism amongst colonial officials,
decrying the ban on freedom of meeting and association, [841]
and above all denouncing the corvée and *indigénat*. The
first Constituent Assembly of 1945, liberal in outlook, was
deeply concerned as to how the Republic could remain
one and indivisible and yet accord any degree of autonomy
to the overseas territories. This was settled by proposing
that the overseas territorial assemblies be thought of as
equivalent to the *conseils* of the metropolitan department [646]
just as that of Senegal had been. The colonies, instead of
forming a federation with France as proposed at the
Brazzaville Conference, were to participate in a French
Union much more integrationist in character and within

648 the assimilationist tradition. Once again, however, the implication of granting full citizenship to all colonials was 641 not faced, for the *loi Lamine Guèye* which extended citizenship to all French *sujets* without prejudice to their *statut personnel* did not in fact extend the right to vote to all of them. However it achieved much in abolishing the humiliating status of *sujet*. The *indigénat*, forced labour and the law against freedom of meeting and association were abolished. And a large scale development plan for overseas territories was projected. But although those Africans eligible to vote supported the new constitution, it was defeated in metropolitan France and the new Constituent Assembly proved to be much more conservative. A powerful group known as the States-General of Colonisation was formed in France with the object of reducing the effect of the concessions already granted to the overseas territories. It attacked the proposed French Union since its members believed that under it France would become a colony of its own colonies.

The second Constituent Assembly elected after the defeat of the first constitution was much less liberal in its attitude towards colonial affairs and as a result the new constitution it drew up was far from that envisaged by the Brazzaville Conference. The structure of the French Union was in- C48 tegrationist. It was composed of the French Republic, which included on the one hand metropolitan France, the Overseas Departments and Territories, among them all the territories of French and Equatorial Africa and the associated states and territories, such as the mandated territories of Togo and Cameroons and the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia on the other. The President of the French Republic would automatically become President of the French Union. The Assembly of the Union was to draw half its members from metropolitan France and half from the overseas territories. As to the composition of the High Council the concept of the wider French Republic was adopted for the choice of members who would share office with representatives of the associated states. Its powers were limited to consultation on matters affecting the overseas territories. 648

The integrationist character of the new constitution was clear from its preamble: 641 648

> France, together with the peoples of its overseas territories, forms a union based on the equality of rights and duties without distinction of race or religion. Faithful to its traditional mission France intends to lead the people she has taken into her charge towards freedom to administer themselves and to regulate their own affairs democratically, ruling out all methods of colonisation founded on arbitrary acts; she guarantees to all equal access to the public service as well as the individual and collective exercise of rights and liberties confirmed heretofore.

Under the new constitution French citizenship was extended on 7 May 1946 to all French colonial subjects; but in practice the franchise was limited to those whose political education was considered sufficient (e.g. ex-servicemen, civil servants, and the literate or wealthy, etc.), so that of all France's vast overseas population only 1½ million were given the vote. But a number of liberal features were retained. General Councils were established for each territory, though with dual colleges for all but Senegal so that European representation could be secured. Separate rolls were used for election to the Senate and the Assembly of the French Union though a single roll was used for the National Assembly. A Grand Council was established for the eight territories of French West Africa, with members [646] elected by the individual General Councils whose powers were purely advisory and thus no greater than those of the old Senegalese General Council. The constitutional position of Senegal itself was consequently little changed, except that there was no longer a major distinction between *sujet* and citizen. It still remained an integral part of the French Republic. The French Parliament, to which it sent two deputies, still had the final say on all questions of public liberty, and political and administrative organisation. The new General Council replaced the old Colonial [646]

648 641 [646] Council in [redacted] but differed little in competence. The only [redacted] made to Senegal and not to the other terri[redacted], and this undoubtedly being influenced by its political history, was the retention of a single college electorate as against the dual colleges prescribed for all other territories. [671] The French penal code was made generally applicable for Senegal. In January 1946 the three *communes de pleine exercice* (Gorée had by then been incorporated in [633] Dakar) were given full municipal status as equivalent French towns. Finally and most important, forced labour was [466] legally abolished; but it survived in covert forms for several years to come. In Senegal, Senghor received the full credit for this measure from his peasant electorate and has been drawing political dividends from it ever since.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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V. AFRICAN REACTION AGAINST ASSIMILATION

> I admit that as Negro students in the years 1930–4 we were only an obstruction. I admit that we were racialist; we were intoxicated by the banner of Negritude. At that time no intercourse was possible with Europeans. But since then, because this racialism betrayed our African-Negro humanism, because it led to deadlock by imposing cold war between races and continents, between man and man, we decided upon reflection to make an extra effort. Today we have accomplished this—the results of European decolonisation have contributed to it—we have left behind us the period of denial to embark with you upon the period of construction. [illegible]
>
> LÉOPOLD SÉDAR SENGHOR

THE 1946 constitution as far as Senegal and the other more advanced territories of French Africa were concerned really fell between two stools. In so far as it was assimilationist, it was not sufficiently so. If France were ever to establish her Franco-African republic it had to be on the basis of the equality implicit in assimilation. And this equality was denied at many turns. In so far as it permitted decentralisation in the form of territorial and federal assemblies, it was to encourage the growth of nationalist and regional politics. In Senegal, where the changes made were of relatively little importance, the failure to put into practice a fully assimilationist policy was to be one of the predominant influences behind the reaction against assimilation that was the distinguishing feature of the next decade of Senegalese politics. 648 [668]

Overseas leaders had been particularly disillusioned with French honesty in the application of the Overseas Labour Code. This code was drawn up at the Brazzaville Conference and promised amongst other things equal pay for equal work, 648 641 466

[p 35]

648 a forty hour week, a minimum wage, the development of
641 trade unions and the institution of a labour inspectorate.
466 However the second Constituent Assembly procrastinated in according these economic rights to its overseas citizens and was dissolved before it could bring them into force. It was only in 1952 that the overseas deputies were able to force this measure through.

648 One of the reasons for the break-up of the old *S.F.I.O.*
665 in 1948, which may be taken as symbolic of the reaction against assimilation, was the attitude of the parent party in France to social legislation for the overseas territories. The *S.F.I.O.* had voted against equal pensions for African
[641] and metropolitan French veterans; it had voted against the introduction of the French social security system for the overseas departments, and it had abstained on a motion to abolish the dual college system. But more important was the desire of the newly enfranchised 'bush' peasants for greater participation in the direction of party policy. Hitherto the party, closely linked with the parent body in France, had been tightly ruled by Lamine Guèye from Dakar. At the 1947 Congress of the party a group of members led by Senghor demanded a greater voice in party councils. The people of the bush, so long denied the rights accorded to the privileged of the *Quatre Communes*, once enfranchised showed their resentment against both those who exercised these rights and those who granted them. In the following year Senghor, backed not only by the intellectuals but by the vast majority of the bush, founded the *Bloc Democratique Sénégalais* (*B.D.S.*) declaring that 'Assimilation is an illusion in a world whose people have become aware of their own personality'. He attacked the *S.F.I.O.* for its close ties with France and its failure to take an independent line on African matters. So just as Lamine Guèye has been described as the representative
[668] of the era of assimilation, so Senghor can be dubbed the
648 representative of reaction to this policy.

668 This reaction was at first not part of a concerted

movement, though by the late fifties it amounted to a definite 648
revolt against the basic assumption of an assimilationist 668
policy that there was nothing of worth in African culture and that the greatest benefit France could bring to Africans was to make them French. It was hardly surprising that those to whom this policy had been most heavily applied should be the first to react. Thus in political and cultural affairs the Senegalese were in the vanguard of the campaign for the recognition of the African personality, or in French African terms *la négritude.* This new movement showed
itself in many fields. In politics it was to manifest itself in a [665]
rupture with the metropolitan French parties, and the assertion of the necessity of the incorporation of traditional African values into European-type political systems. On the human plane it insisted on the dignity of the African, the originality of his personality and his contribution to the achievement of the human race. In the cultural field it
implied a return to the values of African art, which educated [532]
Africans until recently had themselves tended to reject. As regards history, it denied the common European allegation that Africans had no history and asserted that Africans had in fact made a far greater contribution to world history than was revealed in text books. Finally it was to produce a picture of a suffering Africa, exploited and abused by the white man, awakening slowly to a glorious day of freedom.

The policy of Senghor's new party, which was not allied 665
to any metropolitan party, was characteristic of this revolt. 668
Its declared aim was to promote a new form of African 648
socialism, related to the realities of the African situation. Accordingly the party was to be organised to correspond with the socio-ethnic structure of the country. It demanded a greatly increased autonomy for Senegal and other African countries, and whilst not demanding independence, a word that did not touch the public lips of any major French African politician for another ten years, it advocated a federal relationship between France and her overseas territories.

648 668 This move was the more surprising since Senghor was and is one of the most highly assimilated of French Africans. He was the first African to gain his *agrégation*. He was effectively the grammarian of the constitution of the Fourth Republic, and whenever there was a dispute as to the interpretation of the constitution in the National Assembly it was as often as not the second deputy of Senegal to whom the President of the Assembly referred for advice. As a member of a rich [633] family of merchants from Joal, a town which though not privileged like the *Quatre Communes*, had long-standing connexions with Europe, he had been able to pursue his education in France and became a professor there. He was well known in literary circles as a writer and poet. Indeed as those who have wished to malign him have since asserted, he seemed almost more French than the French. But, and it is an important but, his return to his African past, his sudden resentment of his own Frenchness and his search for virtue in the African personality was the result of his sudden realisation of the extent of his assimilation by France, though he himself has said that he assimilated, and was not assimilated. Perhaps his dilemma is best illuminated by the experience of Aimé Césaire, the High Priest of *négritude*, who as Senghor is always the first to admit, was his real source of inspiration for this return to the past. The story goes that Césaire, a West Indian living for long in Paris, and already distinguished as a man of letters, was travelling in a train, when he found himself sitting next to a black marine. His first racial reaction was that of a white man. This horrified him so much that he returned to his native West Indies to 'rediscover' himself, and wrote a series of poems, that have become as it were the hymns of *négritude*. Senghor subsequently became the fulcrum of the new movement to assert the uniqueness and value of the Negro personality. Ulli Beier, reviewing Senghor's poetry, has written: 'Senghor is not merely a Frenchified African who tries to give exotic interest to his French poems; he is an African who uses the French language to express his African soul.'

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Those who have not come under the influence of a strong 648
assimilation policy have never had to assert their essential 668
négritude. Thus the English-speaking African, whose culture and traditional political organisation was largely left intact by the British administration, was rarely concerned about his identity as an African and until very recently this problem has been of little concern for the Nigerian or Ghanaian. It has never occurred to him to doubt his *négritude*. There are of course a number of examples of what may be called assertion of the African personality in the English-speaking territories, but the cult of *négritude* never caught on in them as it did in Senegal and the other French territories.

Thus it was that the very Africans who had achieved the greatest distinction within the French cultural framework were to be the first to champion a return to the African past in search of their own essential personality. Thus it was that for long Paris became the cultural capital of Africa, for there the books and magazines were published in which they could tell the public of their new ideas. Whilst in the late forties and early fifties the British West African *évolué* was more concerned with the achievement of political
independence from Britain, the French African *évolué* was [665]
more concerned with his cultural emancipation. Senghor's formation of a new political party is more interesting for the emphasis it lays on its reassertion of African values than for any proposed political rupture with France.

The reaction against assimilation, as P. Mercier has 668
pointed out in *Elites Sénégalaises*, came essentially from the new educated generation.

> It is the elite that has given expression to this desire for a return to [571]
> the fountain head . . . From an acceptance of assimilation characteristic of the preceding generation opinion turned first to less sharply defined positions—typified by the slogan 'assimilate, don't be assimilated'—and then the attitudes of refusal, the details of which are still not very clear. Such attitudes accompany a lush ideological growth, to which only a very brief reference can be

668 given here. They are not exempt from inconsistency, they are intertwined with each other. The only point at which all these ideologies concur is that they one and all are the expression of an intense reaction against colonialism—and obviously against the policy of assimilation—and serve as a basis for a growing nationalism.

The reaction against assimilation took the form of a denial of the basic assertion that Africans were a people without history or culture and that they were fortunate to have been taken under the guiding wing of France. The French administrator who declared 'We are the modern Romans. We have civilised these people, and built them roads', was the prime object of their attack. To counter
668 this patronising French attitude Senegalese intellectuals
814 looked into their past to discover an African civilisation which they could show had also played its part in the development of man. They rejected the common nineteenth-century European interpretation of African history which showed a people engaged in interminable internecine and debilitating warfare, who had not discovered the wheel, who lived under appalling conditions of disease and climate, and they substituted their own interpretation of Africa, which was closer to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's picture of the Noble Savage untainted by the evils of modern society. In a few cases they took the somewhat defeatist attitude of Césaire, shouting 'Hurrah for those who invented nothing'. But the more typical reinterpretation, was that of Cheikh Anta Diop, who gives an extreme idealisation of African history. His works—*L'Afrique noire pré-coloniale*, *Nations nègres et cultures* and *L'unité culturelle de l'Afrique noire*—have come under heavy criticism from European scholars. But a critical evaluation is not intended here. What is important is that a Senegalese, of undoubted scholastic attainment, had reinterpreted the history not only of his country but of the continent as a whole, so that it could be put on equal terms with that of Europe. Thus he asserts in *Apports et perspectives culturels de l'Afrique* (*Présence Africaine*) that

Pharaonic Egypt was a Negro civilisation. Since the West 668
acknowledges its debt to Egyptian civilisation, it was also 814
indebted to Negro peoples for its present cultural attainments. '. . . the Egyptian achievement was essentially a Negro one and . . . all Africans without exception can draw from it the same moral benefits that the West does with regard to Graeco-Latin civilisation.' Elsewhere he asserts in *Nations nègres et culture* (1955), 'Intellectuals should study the past not merely for pleasure but to learn lessons from it.' A notable strand in Diop's return to the past is not merely to assert the traditional dignity of the Senegalese, but of all Africans, even though his work shows inevitably a pro-Senegalese bias when he states that the ancient Egyptians spoke a language that was basically Wolof.

The second major string in the bow of reaction to assimilation was the assertion of the original unity of Africans, a unity that had only been broken up by the colonialists. Diop's *L'unité culturelle de l'Afrique noire* is an attempt to prove the fundamental unity of black Africa, for obviously a united Africa would represent a more potent cultural force, and consequently political force, in the face of Europe than one divided into a host of petty states and tribes. Pan-Africanism, on the cultural level, was largely the work of such writers as Diop and Senghor. Its political aspects, not surprisingly, were to be taken up by the more politically conscious English-speaking Africans like Nnamdi Azikiwe and Kwame Nkrumah.

But the most important thesis of all was that of the 668
African personality. And for this Senghor, now President of the Republic of Senegal, was largely responsible. It is all very well for a people to prove that they have a history when others say they have not. But the most important thing, as far as Senghor and other Senegalese intellectuals saw it, was to prove the uniqueness of the African contribution not only to the past but to the present. Thus Senghor asserted that the African had a certain outlook on life that others had not. The essence of the African

668 personality, its uniqueness as Senghor saw it, is best understood from this quotation:

> That is to say that the Negro, traditionally, is not devoid of reason, as people would have me say. But his reason is not discursive, it is synthetic; it is not antagonistic but sympathetic. It has a different mode of perception. Negro reasoning does not detract from the things it contemplates, it does not mould them into two rigid schemes, thereby ignoring their very essence; it flows through the veins of things to arrive at the living heart of reality. The reasoning of the white man is analytical by utilisation, that of the Negro intuitive by participation.

Whether all the advocates of the African personality held so abstruse and philosophical a concept of its character is doubtful. But as the young poet Lamine Diakhite, a close disciple of Senghor, has written: 'Let us admit it, it is thanks to Senghor and Césaire that my generation became aware of itself, that it embarked upon the path of asserting its personality.'

[571] This movement, started in the late forties, was to touch mainly the intellectuals, those who had been most assimilated by the French. The poorer classes had of course not been so effectively alienated from their past. These intellectuals were during the next years to question everything in the light of this newly discovered or rediscovered African personality. Some advocated the shutting of the door against Europe and some of Cheikh Anta Diop's writings have elements of counter-racism. Whilst Europeans have been asserting their superiority over Africans for so long, he counters by asserting the Negro superiority over Europeans. Fortunately this negative attitude did not survive to any important degree.

There was also a healthy questioning of the values of European or Western culture, though this often went to the extremes of outright rejection. David Diop, the young Senegalese poet who died recently in an air crash, accuses
[539] the white man's civilisation of hypocrisy:

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In the country where the houses touch the sky
but where the heart is not touched [539]
In the country where the hand is placed on the Bible
but where the Bible remains closed.*

The forum for this great re-examination of the African 204 past was to be *Présence Africaine*, a bi-monthly review of 668 Negro African culture, founded by a Senegalese called Alioune Diop in 1947 and open 'to all contributors of good-will (white, yellow or black), who might be able to help define African originality and to hasten its introduction into the modern world'. Although the review was Pan-Negro in outlook, its original inspiration came from a small group of Senegalese intellectuals in association [571] with West Indians like Césaire and Haitians like Price-Mars. There was of course nothing parochial about this. It was only that the Senegalese were the first, for the reasons outlined above, to feel really strongly about the reassertion of African culture. And when in 1956 *Présence Africaine's* efforts culminated in the first Congress of Negro Writers and Artists, the Senegalese were to play a dominant role. 668 In his opening speech to the conference Alioune Diop, the secretary and backbone of the organisation, made a moving protest against the myth of a people without culture, a protest that earned the support of all delegates. But his attacks on assimilation can have had relatively little meaning for delegates from the English-speaking territories; whilst some of the American Negro delegates like Richard Wright felt that as far as they were concerned it was impossible to return to a past from which they had been physically and culturally removed for over three centuries. Replying to a brilliant discourse by Senghor on 'The Laws of the Negro African Culture', he asked: 'I wonder where do I, an American Negro, conditioned by the harsh industrial, abstract force of the Western world that has used stern, political prejudices

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* Translated by Ulli Beier.

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668 against the society (which he has so brilliantly elucidated)—where do I stand in relation to that culture?'

Alioune Diop declared:

> Assimilation corresponds to a type of human relationship imposed by colonisation. It demands that the individual (for it affects only individuals) tear himself from his natural context and he who cannot assert his own personality must replace his habits of thinking, feeling and acting by others which he would only share with a foreign community.

By the time of this congress the Senegalese, as well as other Africans, had examined pretty thoroughly the whole question of French assimilation. For instance, A. Wade, a Senegalese, in a paper entitled 'Must Africa evolve a positive law?', [671] protested against the use in his country of a foreign legal system evolved in a different social context and which could not meet all the requirements of traditional society. He called for a new legal system which would be in effect a synthesis of African customary law and French law. In another article he called for a reform of teaching methods in Africa in the light of local conditions. There [571] were few stones this anti-assimilationist élite left unturned in their efforts to re-establish the values of the African past. They presented a dramatic contrast with the élite of the pre-war generation who, like the young men in Ousmane Socé Diop's *Karim*, so readily accepted the virtues of Western ways.

668 648 Amongst this group were a number who fell back not on the values of the African past so much as Marxist theories in their attacks on colonialism and assimilationist policy. Principal amongst this group was Majhemout Diop, leader of the pro-Communist *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance*. [665] In issue No. 14 of *Présence Africaine* he attacked colonialism bitterly:

> There is no possible ambiguity; colonisation equals capitalistic enterprise. Any other explanation is invalid, is deceitful, a myth, a myth of civilisation and of co-operation.
>
> A coloniser cannot be humanitarian . . . that would be the

most irreducible of paradoxes. Colonisation is always measured in terms of gain for the coloniser. 668 648

Between colonialist and colonial there is room only for forced labour, intimidation, pressure, police, theft, rape, obligatory farming, scorn, mistrust, arrogance, self-conceit, deceit, suppressed élites and debased masses.

No human relationship but a relationship based on domination and submission which transform the coloniser into a pawn, an adjutant, a warder, a flogger and the native into an instrument of production.

The resentment of assimilation is the same. But the interpretation is a Marxist one and the remedies subsequently offered by Majhemout Diop were non-African in origin. His *Contribution to the Study of Political Problems in Black Africa* is almost entirely Marxist in inspiration and the source matter, abundantly evident from the footnotes, is the work of Stalin, Lenin, Engels and Marx, none of whom had any first-hand knowledge of economic conditions in Africa. Another Senegalese, of very distinguished academic reputation, who uses Marxist techniques in his studies of African problems, is Ly Abdoulaye, an economic historian [814] who nevertheless is much more inclined to take into account African circumstances in the application of Marxist theories. Indeed Ly is at great pains to avoid Marxist terminology even when employing Marxist ideas. There are in fact few Senegalese intellectuals who are not in some sense Marxist socialists. But more especially they are devotees of what they call African socialism.

In the search for identity that followed the application of 668 assimilationist policy, the first tendency was to rehabilitate African culture. Naturally political rehabilitation was one of the most important goals for politicians like Senghor. But when he broke with the *S.F.I.O.* in 1948, he gave as [665] one of his reasons that French socialism, like Communism, after all, 'did not understand our problems, and wanted to solve them with a plan devised by and for Europe'. His proposed alternative of 'African socialism' was at the time

668 [665] very ill-defined. But with the necessity of finding a new political system appropriate to the African situation there evolved, particularly in Senegal, a fairly coherent doctrine which will be examined in the final chapter.

In the early days a number of assertions were made about the political genius of the African, none of which can be attributed to any one man though as far as Senegal has been concerned Senghor has been the chief theoretician. Whilst appreciating and accepting many of Marx's theories as both politically and economically valid for Africa he believed that Marx would have revised his system in face of African realities as well as the scientific achievements of the twentieth century. He advocated the adoption of Marxism, shorn of its anti-religious doctrine and adapted to African needs. A cardinal point as far as Senghor was concerned, was that African society could not fit into the classical Marxist analysis. Instead he maintained modern African society
[565] had three classes: first the liberal professions and trades; second the salaried employees, civil servants and workers; third the vast peasant mass. Under the colonial regime the former two classes had been able to achieve incomes out of all proportion to the average peasant income of fourteen pounds a year. This peasant class is Marx's proletariat.

To support his policital views, Senghor advanced his theory that the 'Negro-African' was essentially different from the European. 'The African Negro does not distinguish the object nor does he analyse it—he takes it as it is between his hands, he feels it, touches it, smells it; thus the subject and the object are dialectically confronted in the very act of perception, and hence participation and communion.' Others, in their suggestions for a modern African political system showed how they could look to their own (somewhat idealised) African past for guidance. For instance there was no real need for opposition in the European sense. African politics in the village would supply the model. There everyone sat in the palaver house until all were agreed on the formula of action. Once discussed openly

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in this sense, it had to be agreed by everyone and the 668
discussion would not end until agreement was reached. Thus in the modern African society there would be real justification for a one-party state, for in theory no one could be against the Government, since by adopting traditional African methods, all would be agreed to any given course of action. Furthermore Africans already had their own built-in socialism. In the village no one could go hungry. And by an elaborate set of social laws and customs he who had invariably ended by sharing his possessions with those who had not. Above all, Africans could bring to the world this harmony of traditional African society where agreement was reached by all on every political decision, and where a voluntary socialism was already practised—what Senghor described as 'la sagesse africaine'. If Africa had something to bring to the modern world, it was this special political experience.

Despite this intense reaction to France's assimilationist 648
policy by the Senegalese élite, for long no one openly voiced 668
the logical conclusion of such attacks—the demand for total independence. Up until 1958 the most extreme official demand was for a federal constitution in which the African territories could develop along their own lines and have equal political rights with France. But in France, African students were impatient of constitutional niceties which seemed to them to avoid the one and only issue—that of putting an end to colonialism. In 1952 *Présence Africaine* [204]
published a special supplement in which African students, mostly Senegalese, made themselves more than clear on this issue. And whilst it is true that students tend to be much more extreme in their political attitudes than those actually exercising power, amongst the writers in this special supplement were some who were to have considerable influence on the political situation in Senegal as representatives of the young anti-colonialist generation, such as Assane Seck and Majhemout Diop. The latter in his call for immediate, unequivocal and absolute independence was in fact not

648 representative of the main stream of student feeling.
668 Rather it was summed up by Kader Fall in his article 'The Problem of the Elite in Black Africa' in which he concluded: 'The African people, after centuries of colonisation, has a right to demand that its more intelligent members should participate at his side and together in the elaboration of a new world which will see the end of colonial servitude.'

VI. TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

The choice of the Senegalese people is independence; they want it to take place only in friendship with France, not in dispute. 050

Léopold Sédar Senghor (September 1958)

It was not until 1951 that Senghor was able to test the 665
strength of his new party at the elections for the French 666
National Assembly in which it gained both seats with [646]
213,000 votes to the *S.F.I.O.*'s 90,000. His success was proved the next year when he won forty-one out of the fifty seats in the *Conseil-General* under the new and greatly enlarged franchise. His vote came overwhelmingly from the 'bush', since Lamine Guèye still retained strong support in Dakar and St. Louis. The party ticket was a popular one: accusing the French Administration of supporting socialists in the towns and chiefs in the bush.

From a theoretical standpoint as we have seen the *B.D.S.* fitted into the new anti-assimilationist trend in Senegal. It represented the 'unsophisticated' bush against the Gallicised *citoyens* of the *Quatre Communes*. It demanded a return to African values and had an essentially African-style organisation in the bush. But few real differences showed themselves on the platforms adopted by the two parties at the elections.

In the French National Assembly Senghor had joined 648
forces with a number of other deputies from African terri- 665
tories who like himself did not wish to link themselves with one of the metropolitan parties. This group was known as the *Indépendents d'Outre Mer*. As a result of the elections the *I.O.M.* gained thirteen seats, enough to form a recognised group in the National Assembly. However they were never able to mould themselves into a united federal party on the lines of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (*R.D.A.*)

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which had been founded by M. Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast in 1946 and which had branches in all African territories. This party had been closely aligned with the Communists from which it adopted many ideas including its cellular structure, but it was temporarily suppressed by French administrative action because of its extreme and violent tactics, especially in the Ivory Coast. It had however by 1952 broken with the Communists, but in its weakened state it might have found it difficult to rival a well organised *I.O.M.* which was more than just a group of individuals with like ideas. However at their conference at Bobo Dioulasso the *I.O.M.* failed once more to form the necessary federal organisation to compete with either the *R.D.A.* or *S.F.I.O.* as a Pan-African party. Nevertheless the *I.O.M.* were able to play an increasingly important role in the National Assembly in the formation of delicate French government coalitions and were often able to extract as the price of their support concrete returns in the form of aid.

In Senegal the political scene remained calm until the 1956 elections to the National Assembly when the *B.D.S.* came out with what by French African standards was a nationalist programme. As Kenneth Robinson remarks in his admirable study of this and the 1957 elections to the territorial assembly in *Five Elections in Africa*, 'among politically conscious West Africans there has undoubtedly been for several years increasing nationalist feeling, a mood more and more outspokenly hostile to colonial rule, less and less interested in the refinements of juridical forms, more impatient of reformist schemes, and more and more determined that Africans must be masters in their own house'. Thus the *B.D.S.* put strong emphasis on autonomy within a federal association with France. The *B.D.S.* won both seats, with the socialists still strong in the *Quatre Communes*. But on the federal West African level, the *I.O.M.* had done badly and Houphouët Boigny's *R.D.A.*, now purged of its connexions with Communism, a purge

that involved the breaking-away of a number of small 648
sections in various territories, emerged as West Africa's [665]
leading party with nine seats, and joined the Guy Mollet
Government. Under this Government the famous *loi cadre*
was passed establishing for each of the black African [646]
territories a wholly elected assembly, based on universal [641]
adult suffrage. An executive, that could be drawn from
within or without the assembly, was established. Although [643]
the territorial Governor presided over it, it was effectively guided by the Vice-President or Prime Minister. Separate rolls for Europeans were abolished. Thus in one fell swoop all African territories were given the elements of responsible democratic government. Certainly their powers were restricted since a large number of subjects were reserved to the Federation, still run by the French High Commissioner, and checked only by the *Grand Conseil*. The *loi cadre*, whilst it did not envisage independence, and still saw the future of the African territories as within the structure of the French body politic, did in effect set these territories on the road to independence. Senghor, an ardent critic of the *loi cadre*, declared: 'The peoples of Africa do not intend to cut themselves off from metropolitan France; they want to be able to construct, side by side with her, their own buildings which will consolidate and extend French territory.'

The *loi cadre*, whilst it made large concessions to African demands for autonomy, was in fact designed to avoid demands for independence. The new French Government had been influenced to this end by France's unfortunate experiences in other parts of her empire as well as the political progress of the Gold Coast. Furthermore she wished to anticipate moves by the Gold Coast to absorb that part of the former German Togo which she administered and therefore accorded it a limited form of internal autonomy. It was inevitable that having granted this concession to Togo she would eventually have to make it to neighbouring French African territories as well. Whilst considerable

648 powers were devolved on the individual territories, it is clear that a desire to avoid any ultimate break-up of the French Union was one of the main factors behind the emasculation of the federal executive. French West Africa as a federation might soon be demanding independence; eight small territories on their own would find it a more daunting prospect.

Senghor attacked France vigorously for what he called the balkanising of French Africa by devolving powers on individual territories and at the same time making no provision for an executive at the federal level. The *Grand* [646] *Conseil* retained only its limited legislative powers. Executive action for the federation was still undertaken by the High Commissioner, representing the Republic. By thus turning politics towards the individual territories, France was 'balkanising' the federation, following the classic pattern of dividing in order to rule. Bitterly, he accused the French of offering Africa 'sucettes et bonbons'. It may seem odd that the role of defending the federation should have [665] fallen on Senghor, who had already failed to convert the *I.O.M.* from an association of deputies into a Pan West African political party. But though the R.D.A. was officially a Pan-African party, its leader came from the rich Ivory Coast, and disliked intensely the ideas of sharing his country's wealth with his many poorer neighbours. He was instrumental in securing the form of *loi cadre* that avoided the creation of a supra-government. On the other hand it might be argued that it was in Senegal's interest to ensure that the federation did not break up, since one of [633] Dakar's *raisons d'être* was as a federal capital. But Senghor argued cogently that only with a strong West Africa, containing twenty million people, could Africans participate with any sense of political equality and weight of personality with France in the proposed Franco-African Community. 'Within the framework of a French federal republic, a French West Africa of 20 million inhabitants can, side by side with the metropolis, form a stable element and develop its own personality!

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develop its own personality.' The *S.F.I.O.* parties of Africa met in Conakry to found a new socialist party entirely African in basis, called the *Mouvement Socialiste Africain*. Thus after over twenty years Lamine Guèye officially broke one of Senegal's closest links with France. At the same time Senghor called a congress of his allies in other territories from the *I.O.M.* and formed a federal party called the *Convention Africaine*. There were thus three new major African parties, with sections in most of the eight territories of West Africa and some in *A.E.F.*, each preaching African unity. But the federal executive, the very structure through which this could be maintained, was missing.

[666] At the *loi cadre* elections that took place at the end of March 1957, the *R.D.A.*, the most thoroughly organised on the ground, proved the strongest party of the three and in West Africa and gained overwhelming majorities in Soudan, Guinea and Ivory Coast, dominated the coalition in Upper Volta and provided the opposition in Niger and Dahomey. But the party, as was soon proved at the long delayed Bamako Conference of September 1957, was far from united. Its main difference was over the problem of the federal executive. Its President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast had, as a Minister in the French Government, been one of the principal architects of the *loi cadre* and was opposed to the creation of a federal executive. The *R.D.A.*'s very dynamic Vice-President, Sékou Touré of Guinea, formed in the tough school of trade unionism, however championed the creation of a federal executive, and in this respect he was closer to Senghor than to his own party chief. At the Bamako Conference Sékou Touré persuaded the party to adopt it as a prime objective.

[668] Meanwhile in Senegal, ever the source of new things, was born the first African party with the avowed object of independence, the *P.A.I.* (*Parti Africain de l'Indépendance*) led by Majhemout Diop, who had strong Communist sympathies. Till then the word independence had been

648 studiously avoided not only by Senegalese but by nearly
665 all leading French African politicians. The official formula
[668] was the creation of a Franco-African community, in which Africans would have fully autonomous states (or federations if Senghor and Sékou Touré had their way) and matters like defence and foreign affairs would be shared between France and the other member states. As far as the Senegalese were concerned their long attachment to France, despite their reaction against assimilationism, made it difficult to countenance the idea of complete separation. As Senghor always put it, 'fédérer n'est pas séparer.' Furthermore
[651] French aid to West Africa in general and Senegal in particular had been enormous.

The Senegalese thesis on federation made headway in the early months of 1958. After several meetings between the major African parties, the *Convention Africain* and the *M.S.A.* met in Dakar in March and formed the new *Parti du Regroupement Africain*, with the aim of obtaining Federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa, which in turn would be federated with France in the proposed Franco-African community. On 5 April 1958 the *P.R.A.* members of the *Grand Conseil*, plus the *R.D.A.* members, voted in favour of the creation of a federal executive; the only Ivory Coast delegate abstained.

Despite bitterness over the question of the federal
[668] executive, there was still little open talk about independence except by the *P.A.I.* and this despite the example of Ghana. This situation was to be abruptly changed by the *putsch* of the military in Algiers on 13 May.

648 In presenting his new constitution for the Fifth Republic to the French people, de Gaulle made it a straight choice of Yes or No. As far as the French were concerned this was a reasonable choice. Acceptance or rejection. Once rejected, there was the possibility of trying again as they had done in 1946. But as far as the overseas territories were concerned, they were given no alternative. They either accepted the constitution, whose details we shall examine

shortly, or rejected it and took what de Gaulle described as independence with all its consequences. Under the constitution France and her overseas territories were to form a Franco-African Community in which each territory would become an autonomous republic, but would pool certain matters such as defence, foreign affairs, currency and higher education in the Executive Council of the Community. Thus once again we have the traditional French dilemma over assimilation, this time in its most acute form. Once again we have the paradox of an authoritarian regime introducing liberal reforms. On the one hand de Gaulle's Franco-African Community satisfied assimilationist theory by creating a supreme institution, the Senate of the Community, and a supreme executive, the Council of the Community, in which France and Africa would participate on roughly equal terms, whilst on the other hand he conceded a great degree of autonomy to all the overseas territories. Furthermore de Gaulle offered, albeit with little grace, independence to any territory that cared to take it—an offer that had hitherto never been considered by French politicians. This actually tied in with a growing resentment in France against the cost of the colonies. From 1946-1958 France had spent in the form of aids and subsidies over £400 million in French West Africa alone. Much of this money was spent on lavish schemes often of dubious economic worth. In France many people, particularly after a series of articles in *Paris-Match* by Raymond Cartier, began to question the worth of colonies which cost so much and whose leaders seemed to them so ungrateful for all they received. This attitude received the nickname of *Cartierisme*. 648

Judging by earlier statements of both Senegalese and other African politicians the *loi cadre* might well seem to have been a liberal solution to the problem of small poor countries economically and culturally linked to France. But already Ghana had gained her independence, and Nigeria was scheduled for it in 1960. In Senegal resentment against the nature of the *loi cadre* and the large number of students [668]

648 returning from France imbued with anti-colonialist ideas
668 made the issue of independence a burning one. Yet the difficulty of making a complete break with her cultural parents was made clear by Joseph Ma Thiam, a member of F.E.A.N.F. (Federation of Students from French Black Africa) who wrote: 'We are not anti-French, that would be ridiculous and impossible. We are simply Africans and we want not minor reforms, called *loi-cadre* or Community, but a revolution of which the necessary outcome will be independence, as this is conceived of and put into practice in the twentieth century.'

For the Senegalese leaders, as indeed for other African leaders, the choice was a difficult one. The idea of sudden rupture with France, which de Gaulle's choice implied, was not only economically terrifying, but rather like the impending break-up of a family. So many of the leaders had lived so much of their lives in Paris that the prospect of such imminent separation was difficult to contemplate. It
665 is against this background that the conference of the *P.R.A.*
668 at Cotonou from 25-27 July 1958 must be seen. Here dele-
648 gates met to consider the situation created by the projected new constitution. At that stage the terms of the constitution were not clearly known, though it was general knowledge that they would not be favourable to the idea of total independence. At the conference delegates were carried away by demands for independence and voted for 'Immediate independence; the creation of a solid and progressive African Community; and negotiation with France for the creation of a multi-national confederation of free and equal peoples.' The last two items were in accord with current Senegalese feeling that federation was the only way to secure equality of the African personality in a Franco-African Community. But the morrow of the conference saw a number of delegates reflecting on the demand for immediate independence. The rupture seemed too abrupt and, as Mamadou Dia pointed out, they did not even know the terms of the new constitution. He expressed doubts on

the ability of Senegal to accede immediately to independ- 665
ence. In certain territories, particularly in Senegal and 668
Dahomey, pressure was brought to bear by France on the 648
delegates against taking so drastic a step, so that the *P.R.A.* withdrew from its earlier stand and said that effectively the decision over the constitution would be left to each territorial section. In August the burning question for both the *P.R.A.* and *R.D.A.* was answered by General de Gaulle on his tour of Africa prior to the referendum in September: The right of independence would be inscribed in the constitution. But, he later added ominously, those who voted No to his constitution now would take all the consequences. For all states so economically dependent on France this was a considerable threat. Thus few leaders did in fact campaign against the constitution. In Guinea, Sékou Touré with a superb party organisation, managed to obtain a 97 per cent vote against the constitution and took independence with all its consequences, which involved the French destroying all their files and even taking away the telephones! In Niger the Premier, Djibo Bakary failed to carry his campaign against the constitution, and was forced reluctantly to resign, and after the subsequent election which was won by his *R.D.A.* opponents, to flee the country. In this matter it was said, the French who suspected Djibo Bakary of extreme left-wing sympathies were determined not to have 'a hole in the desert'.

In Senegal the situation was confused. Not until th[illegible] last minute did the *P.R.A.* come out definitely in favo[illegible]f the constitution. De Gaulle received a hostile reception on his visit to Dakar. Three radical members of the *P.R.A.* Ly Abdoulaye, Assane Seck and Amadou M. M'Bow declared they would vote No, whatever the rest of the Party decided. On 11 December the *P.R.A.* section of the Senegal party decided to vote Yes. The three members who had declared they would vote No resigned, formed a new party confusingly called *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and joined with the *P.A.I.* and campaigned against de Gaulle. Once the decision of the

648 majority party had been made, however, there was little
668 doubt as to the outcome of the Referendum. But the seeds
[665] of independence had been sown.

Almost immediately after the Referendum the planners got down to work seeking to create the federal executive that had escaped them under the *ancien régime.* Guinea meanwhile had become independent and there was a certain satisfaction amongst those who voted Yes at the difficulties so abrupt a break with France entailed. Alas, as was later realised, Guinea independent and the rest still within the Community, meant the first crack in the old federation. On 29 December delegates from Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey, together with observers from Mauretania, met to consider the possibility of creating a new federation.

On 17 January 1959 a federal constitution was promulgated with the accord of all four governmental delegations, and the new Mali came into being. However pressures from France and from Houphouët-Boigny, who still bitterly opposed any form of federation, soon forced Upper Volta and Dahomey to withdraw, reducing Mali to two member states: Senegal and Soudan.

648 The new federation was short lived. In Soudan there had
665 been almost unanimous support for the federation, but in
Senegal a number of religious chiefs, in association with Ibrahim Seydou N'Daw, formerly President of the Senegalese Assembly, and an important member of the governing *U.P.S.* party, formed the Senegalese Solidarity Party and together with the two left-wing parties, the *Parti Africain de l'Indépendence* and the *P.R.A.*—Senegal campaigned
[666] against the proposed federation. At the polls the Government won a resounding victory.

Thus in both Senegal and Soudan the leaders who had chosen the path of federation won triumphant approval, though as Mamadou Dia admits somewhat ruefully, the people followed their leaders blindly on this question. It is essential here to note that the two countries were

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governed by different parties, and in each territory that 648
party held all the parliamentary seats. In any election to 665
the Federal Assembly, which was by nomination of each territorial house of an equal number of seats, there could well be deadlock. However on 24 March 1959 Soudanese and Senegalese met in Dakar to form the new African Federalist Party, to which delegates from Niger and Dahomey came. The new party was formed, then, from the *R.D.A.* of Soudan, the *U.P.S.* which was the official Senegal Section of P.R.A., which in effect contained both *M.S.A.* and *Convention Africaine* as well as the small Senegal *R.D.A.* the Niger *P.R.A.* (in effect *M.S.A.*) and the Dahomey *P.R.A.* Thus, with the exception of the small *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and the small *P.A.I.*, Mali had only one effective party. This detailed composition shows that the Mali Federation could not then be called a one-party state. Indeed the local politicians described their party as a 'unified party', which admitted opposition outside the party as well as within.

From the start the Mali Federation ran into difficulties 648
with France, which initially refused to recognise her existence. Thus Modibo Keita did not attend the first three meetings of the executive council of the Community because of this failure to recognise the State of which he was head. However de Gaulle soon realised that Mali was there to stay and gave her recognition and Modibo Keita attended the fourth meeting of the Community Executive at Tananarive in Madagascar. It was not long before the leaders of Mali decided to take advantage of the clause in the constitution which apparently allowed members of the Community to become independent and yet remain members. For long the French Government would not commit itself to granting independence, and only when the question was raised at the sixth meeting of the Community Executive at St. Louis in Senegal on 13 December did de Gaulle give it his blessing. But there followed long and protracted negotiations over the terms of independence,

C48 the main drawback for Mali being the concessions she had to make over the military base at St. Louis. Far from cutting [651] Mali off without a penny as she had Guinea, France promised to continue her aid. Mali's decision to take independence marked the beginning of the end of the Franco-African Community, and indeed of France's political assimilation of her African states.

This done, the Mali Federation was all set for independence. But there were internal hurdles to overcome. Mali may well have been ruled by a unified party, but there were definite differences between Soudanese and Senegalese. Soudan was the larger, more populous territory, but the poorer. It was much more left wing and politically was run very much more strictly than Senegal. The party controlled everything. To appreciate this one must remem- [665] ber that the *R.D.A.* was initially allied to the Communists and had adopted their cell technique for its own party organisation. This system of administration proved most effective and explains why Sékou Touré was able to keep so firm a hold on Guinea after the French had gone. Senegal, however, after three centuries of contact with the [641] French, was much more affected by French ideas of liberty and certainly found this rather ruthless element in its Soudanese partner disturbing. For instance at the constitutional conference preceding independence the Soudanese demanded that a unitary state be created, and that the excess burden of two territorial governments be removed. They also wanted a president with strong powers like those enjoyed by de Gaulle. The Senegalese, who saw many dangers to themselves in such a constitution protested successfully on the moral grounds that it would prevent other states from joining Mali—which was after all the federation's main *raison d'être*. The Senegalese won the day after bitter wrangling. Of course, though Senegal as the richer partner effectively subsidised the federation, she had [439] her own interests in maintaining it since Soudan exported its ground-nuts along the railway from Bamako to Dakar.

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Certain left-wing elements in Soudan had already insinuated that if the Senegalese made trouble, they could easily build a railway line from Bamako to Kankan, the railhead in Guinea, or send their ground-nuts down the road to Bobo Dioulasso and thence by rail to Abidjan. If no Eastern bloc power were forthcoming to help them to do this, they said they could always do it by communal effort.

Despite these differences, independence was achieved on 20 June 1960. On the surface all seemed well. But there was in fact considerable tension and only two months after independence the federation broke up. Matters came to a head when Modibo Keita tried to remove Mamadou Dia, the Vice President, from his post as Minister of Federal Security and Armed Forces, a post the Senegalese felt it was necessary to hold as a guarantee for their participation in the federation. Modibo also tried to call out the army to assert his authority as President. Meanwhile, unknown to the Soudanese, Senghor and the Senegalese ministers had decided that the federation was unworkable in the circumstances and on the morning of 20 June, Modibo Keita and the other Soudanese ministers found themselves under house arrest and the whole of Dakar under the control of the *gendarmerie* and armed supporters of Senghor who had been brought in from the bush. The same day they were packed off by rail and air to Bamako. The details of the break-up need not concern us here. The reasons for it are confused. Each partner in the federation has its own version of the story. The contemporary vocabulary of political abuse has been used to the full by both partners ever since. What is important are not the machinations of one side against the other, but the fundamental defects in the federation. First of all the two states found it almost impossible to co-operate within the framework of an ill and hastily devised constitution. Second it was unfortunately a federation of only two states, meaning that with unbalance of population—Soudan was larger in size and population, but much poorer and

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648 more backward in every way—one could try and dominate the other. Indeed Senegal felt she was subsidising Soudan whilst that territory, it was believed, was taking all the plum jobs. Third, in such a federation it was not surprising that there should be a clash of personalities between the two regional leaders, Senghor and Modibo Keita. They proved quite incompatible, each representing entirely different political traditions. And though nominally they now belonged to the same political party the *P.F.A.*, in fact they had entirely different outlooks. Modibo Keita represented a country of considerable poverty, with a very small educated élite, where ministers worked in the fields for three weeks each year. The population undertook voluntary labour on government projects. Altogether it was a puritan, left-wing regime anxious to lift its peoples out of their age-long poverty, intolerant of opposition and very ascetic in its approach to life.

The Senegalese were almost entirely opposite in every [665] way. Politically the *U.P.S.* was much more liberal, flanked on either side by extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing opposition parties. Indeed the *U.P.S.* itself was an amalgamation of two parties. Senegal by comparison, was much richer, the population less interested in the type of ascetic left-wing politics practised in Mali. But above all the conflict between the two came from their widely different political histories. Senegal had nearly 150 years' experience of European-style politics, Soudan barely fourteen. The conflict between the sophisticated communes and the neglected bush that had been instrumental in Senghor's foundation of the *B.P.S.* in 1948, seemed to be repeating itself in a new form. The Soudanese found it difficult to co-operate with their sophisticated neighbours who seemed to take politics and indeed life far less seriously than they did, who seemed too identified with France as a result of long contact and the latter's policy of assimilation. This conflict seemed to be embodied in the personalities of their two leaders. Senghor, poet, philosopher, political theoretician, *agregé-ès-grammaire* from the Sorbonne, at home 648 in any *salon* in Paris; from a middle class commercial family in long contact with Europe, seemed to sum up Senegal on the one hand; whilst Modibo Keita was an aristocrat—tracing his ancestry to the emperors of the great kingdom of Mali, a simple school teacher, with few intellectual pretensions. And so these two countries, so alike to the casual observer, were unable to co-operate, mainly for reasons of history.

The night before Senghor despatched the Mali ministers to Bamako, the Senegalese Assembly in an emergency [646] session had declared Senegal an independent nation which subsequently applied for membership of the United Nations. Soudan, which now called itself the Mali Republic, left the Franco-African Community; Senegal decided to remain as an independent member. This was, however, very much a token gesture, for all members of the Community had now either taken independence or announced their intention of doing so. Several had left it altogether. Consequently it could no longer claim to be the Franco-African Community originally conceived by de Gaulle, and became instead a rather casual commonwealth.

As an independent nation Senegal chose to retain close ties with France. Indeed her politicians and her whole social structure had been profoundly influenced by her long contact with that country, so that any radical rupture in relations such as Guinea had experienced and the Mali Republic at one stage appeared to contemplate, would have been quite out of character. The next three chapters will try to describe first what sort of society has evolved through this long contact and second what the Senegalese hope to do within their independence.

VII. THE FRENCH IN SENEGAL

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> The less intelligent the white man, the more stupid the black man seems to him.
>
> André Gide

563 369 The first thing that strikes the casual visitor to Dakar is the large number of Europeans and the apparent absence of any colour problem. Senegal in fact has an exceptionally good record of race relations, especially when one considers that the proportion of Europeans to Africans is much higher than in many countries with acute racial problems. The French in Senegal today probably [162] number some 40,000 of which nearly 30,000 live in Dakar alone. In comparison with other territories of French speaking Africa, Senegal has always had a large European minority, and this has increased rapidly since the war. Thus in Senegal the policy of assimilation was not applied in the abstract by the metropolitan Government to a people who, with the exception of administrative officials, had practically no daily contact with Frenchmen. In the major towns the Senegalese have been used to the presence of a substantial French community for well over seventy years. But, as we shall see, it was one thing for the metropolitan Government to initiate a policy of assimilation and quite another to expect its citizens to apply it on a personal level in their relations with the people who were being assimilated.

[162] Though the French community in Senegal is relatively large and in Dakar constitutes at least a tenth of the population, it must not be confused in character with the settler communities of Kenya and Rhodesia.

563 The great majority of Frenchmen have no intention of remaining in Senegal after their retirement. On independence few Frenchman opted for Senegalese nationality

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though few picked up their bags and left 'in disgust at the new order of things'. Of course in certain uninformed quarters there was the inevitable short-lived panic about what independence would mean for the French community, and even today, despite reassurances from the Government, certain sectors remain oversensitive to each move or speech made by a Minister. For many Frenchmen their stay in Senegal is not longer than five years, and as a result there is a higher proportion of bachelors than one would normally expect in a community that had intentions of making the country its permanent home. This proportion is largely accounted for by the presence of a French army base. 563 [648]

On the other hand the Dakar European population has none of the temporary character of the English communities in West Africa. Far from living in reservations outside the city, as is still the case with the European population of Lagos, they have moved into the centre of the town and made it a small corner of Europe, and the more the French population has increased the more it has tended to create a metropolitan life for itself in Africa. The range of European-style shops, the number of restaurants, night-clubs, and women's hairdressers shows that although the Dakar Frenchman may have no intention of settling in the city for good, he is determined to live his life in the maximum comfort during his stay. There is relatively little of the attitude of living for the next leave. 563 369

Another distinguishing feature of the European community in Senegal is that not only is it not a true settler community but also its economic interests, whilst vast, have not involved any important alienation of land and until very recently have not brought it into conflict with African economic interests. Dakar can in no way be considered a small Algiers. The majority of Europeans, whose per capita income is about £600 a year, are employed by the Administration or commercial and industrial undertakings in executive posts or in technical and clerical positions [463]

563 for which no trained African staff is available. There is a
369 wide range of professional occupations, but private enter-
[463] prise by individuals is largely restricted to higher-class
shopkeeping and the running of bars and restaurants.
Most of the export and import trade is still in the hands of
[439] the large commercial houses controlled from France as
distinct from individual Frenchmen in Dakar.

Relations between the African and European communities have been remarkably good. There have been no really significant racial conflicts in Dakar since the war. But relations are *negatively* good. That is to say that there is almost no contact between the two groups outside work. The French in Dakar, despite the official assimilationist policy of the mother country, have shown little inclination to extend it on a personal plane during their sojourn in Dakar. On the other hand when they were officially representatives of the colonial Power they rarely attempted to enforce discrimination against Africans. Apart from the time of the unfortunate Vichy episode there has never been any open discrimination in Dakar. Africans always had legal access to all places the French had, though inevitably there were a number of private associations such as the *Amicales des Provinces Françaises* which excluded Africans by definition though never by statute. A visitor might be tempted to think that the absence of Africans from the French-style cafés in the main streets of Dakar indicated some subtle form of discrimination, but in fact any African entering would be served, and the sparseness of African clientele is determined by economic and social reasons. Drinks are enormously expensive in such bistros, and few
[162 Muslims, who form the majority of the population in Dakar,
779] care to be seen drinking in public. Nevertheless it is true
that proprietors of certain bars do their best to maintain a
white clientele.

There is a certain residential separation, once more largely determined by economics. The expensive European

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flats and villas are usually beyond the range of the African purse though the difference is being eliminated by the accession of Senegalese, immediately prior to and in particular since independence, to high administrative posts and today there is no real residential separation. Many Europeans live in housing estates built primarily for Africans and not a few live in the Medina or main African quarter. Some trade unions are divided on racial lines between Africans and Europeans, largely because the European workers are skilled technicians and there are even to this day few Africans trained in most of the industrial work done by Europeans. 563 [369] [467] [463]

Nevertheless there are certain cases of bitterness between Africans and Europeans over the question of equal pay for equal work. Though the basic principle is that both groups should be paid the same rate for the same kind of work, the European in many cases gets an expatriation addition of up to two-fifths of his basic salary. This is not true of all classes of work. For instance shop girls in Printania, a local version of Woolworth's, earn the same pay whether white or black though of course the European staff are recruited locally from wives and daughters of Frenchmen working in Dakar. It is surely a healthy sign that Europeans and Africans can work together on equal terms and that Europeans can occupy what in Europe would be considered very humble positions. 563 465

One does not detect amongst the French in Senegal any very strong feeling for or against the African. Where any form of racism does manifest itself it is mainly at the level of the artisan worker or the *petit blanc*, a term generally used to describe the poorer white community of small shopkeepers, clerks, mechanics and skilled workers. When the Senegalese are confronted by outbursts of racism from members of this group they are usually inclined to return the abuse in kind, for the Senegalese are naturally an immensely proud people and have very little feeling of racial inferiority. Close contact with a French community 563 [571]

563 that ranges from the Olympian civil servant to a taxi driver and a clerk without work, has left them under no illusion about the equal fallibility of the European. This is in direct contrast to Nigeria where until very recently all Europeans held executive posts, lived in large houses in separate reservations, had cars, servants and high incomes, all of which gave the impression to the vast majority of Nigerians who had not travelled overseas that the English were a race which commanded and did not occupy itself with subaltern work. Thus to this day, even [369] in Lagos, the European is still a 'remarkable' being. In Dakar the Frenchman passes unremarked, and the *Dakarois* is as used to seeing him on foot or on a velo-cycle as in a car, with the result that the Senegalese on the whole do not have any complex about the European as a person although he does about the technical superiority of the European and about France's insistence on the superiority of its culture.

P. Mercier, the French sociologist, in an investigation into [369] the habits of the European community in Dakar, found that very few Europeans had African friends outside work, and that contact between white and black was largely limited to the following spheres: among colleagues, employees, and domestic servants, in cultural and sporting activities, and in schools. Few marriages take place between African and European in Dakar and when they do they are usually between African male and European female, and are contracted in Paris. There are two obvious explanations for this. For many it is impossible to find a wife of the same intellectual level in a society where Islam has retarded female education. For many others the need for a companion leads to love affairs and eventual marriage with women whom they would not consider marrying at home. The reason that few French women marry Africans in Senegal, as distinct from in France, is that they become more aware of the type of society into which they are [596] marrying. It is very difficult for the European woman,

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with her restricted notions about the family, to integrate 563 successfully into the extended family, especially in a [596] territory like Senegal where family relations are of such importance that it is practically forbidden to refer to the economic burden they cause. The European wife often insists on her husband breaking with the extended family and restricting the family to the usual European size. Instances of marriage between European male and African females are rare because of the small number of well educated African females.

This all builds up to a picture of a French community with little interest in assimilating the Senegalese to their own standards. But a number of points must be stressed. On the whole the French have always accepted the Senegalese as equals. There is a strict code of mutual courtesy [576] between Senegalese and all but the most uncouth Frenchmen. As Claude Duchemin of the *Institut Francais d'Afrique Noire* has written: 'A genuine "niceness" was apparent in their daily contacts, simply and with no ostentation, as if it were quite natural. It seemed that each wanted to prove to the other his wish to play the game loyally, without complexes.' Also there has been remarkably little use of [198] 'pidgin' in Senegal, a debased form of French which by implication infers an inferior recipient.

But most important of all is the fact that a small minority of Frenchmen, fortunately usually in positions of authority have followed personally an assimilationist policy. This has been most marked in the political sphere. Though the great majority of Frenchmen who were interviewed by Mercier had nothing to do with local politics and even talked in terms of maintaining 'white solidarity' a few were militant politicians alongside men like Senghor and Lamine Guèye. Men like Maître Paul Bonifay, until recently deputy Mayor of Dakar, who was Secretary of the *S.F.I.O.* in Dakar for many years, or André Peytavin, who worked closely with Senghor in the early days of the *B.D.S.* and was chosen as Minister of Finance in the Government [645]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

563 [645] formed as a result of the *loi cadre* reforms, are typical of the Frenchmen who have identified themselves with the country of their sojourn. Indeed such was the devotion of Peytavin to his party's cause that he was retained as Minister of Finance even after independence and opted for Senegalese nationality, a step that Bonifay found himself unable to take. These were men of high education—Bonifay, a well known lawyer, and Peytavin a veterinary surgeon. There were many others like them, not only applying such principles in the political field, but in the administration and commerce, who helped to dispel from the African what would otherwise have been a dominant impression of an isolationist and sometimes racist French community.

[369] [571] It would be foolish to paint too idealised a picture of race relations in Dakar. Many Europeans, particularly the *petit blanc*, openly admit to holding the African in contempt. But these are usually Europeans of little economic or political consequence and since independence their opinions have obviously carried negligible weight with the Senegalese.

Furthermore most Europeans in Dakar and the other main towns of Senegal, whatever their prejudices, send their children to local schools, where perforce they mix on terms of equality with Africans. The same is true of [873] Dakar University which has a large number of French students, the majority of whom are girls whose parents are working in Dakar. Their brothers try if possible to go to French universities. Though friendships tend to be [572] within the same racial group, there is a considerable number of inter-racial friendships.

563 369 463 472 The main point of conflict would appear to the casual visitor to be the economic domination of private enterprise and the more important subaltern jobs by Europeans. But before analysing any tensions that have arisen from this, it is essential to point to some special features of Senegalese society. In Senegal, by contrast with Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast, there is no entrepreneurial class of

Africans. Indeed only very small scale trading is in the 563
hands of Africans, otherwise large scale commercial 369
enterprises are run by Europeans, and most of their mana- 463
gerial staff being European. Between these large scale [498]
organisations, the whole range of middleman trade is
dominated by Lebanese and the so-called *petit blancs*. [571]
Small shopkeeping is predominantly in the hands of the Mauritanians, though larger shops particularly in Dakar, are run by Lebanese and Europeans. At first sight this would seem to be an unhealthy situation, and it would be foolish to ignore the inherent dangers in it. But the most ardent critics of this state of affairs are as often as not visiting Africans, not the Senegalese themselves. When a Nigerian shops in Printania or goes to the local bank in Dakar, he is shocked by the number of Frenchwomen employed in jobs he is accustomed to seeing held by Africans in Lagos. But in considering the rather special case of Dakar one must take into account a number of factors that are often overlooked by would-be critics.

Senegal is a territory of only 3,100,000 people and in the [161]
normal run of education in French-speaking African states, even taking into account Senegal's special position among them, the percentage of the population available to fill managerial and sub-managerial posts or indeed any 'European-style' job in all sectors of the economy, can hardly match up to the requirements of the most highly
industrialised city in West Africa. In addition Dakar has a [508]
large international airport and a port that was the third [504]
largest in the French Union. It is also the centre of govern- [496]
ment for Senegal and the terminus of a railway. It is not 463
surprising therefore that Senegal finds it more difficult
to find the appropriate number of Africans to fill its senior 563
posts in commerce and industry than Lagos which has a Nigerian population of over 36 million to draw on. Furthermore Lagos is in the centre of an area where missionaries have been active for over a hundred years and consequently

463 [563] has enjoyed a much higher rate of education than was possible in an Islamic community like Senegal, even taking into account French assimilation policy.

There is a pronounced bias in Senegal against entering into commerce, whether at the African level or at the European level. This bias has been observed by many Europeans. It may be thought of as a mere attempt to explain away the lack of success or rather a lack of desire and intention to Africanise commerce, but against this view, M. Assane Seck, one of the leaders of the Opposition [665] *P.R.A.-Sénégal* and a lecturer at the university, who might normally be only too pleased to pin the slow rate of Africanisation of commerce on the Government, has said that one of the chief obstacles to the Africanisation of economy at [571] its higher levels is the preference of the Senegalese élite, and even the lesser educated classes, for work in the Administration. [647] Under the French the Administration seems to have enjoyed a very high status especially as rates of pay [465] have always been considerably higher than in commerce and industry. Commerce, even when it pays better, has among the Senegalese something of the smear it had in ninteenth-century England.

471 [472] Another barrier to the Africanisation of shopkeeping and small scale private enterprise is the difficulty the Senegalese have in amassing capital. The obligations towards members [596] of the extended family are such that a man with money has calls made on it from even his most distant relatives. This social parasitism is much stronger in Senegal than in most West African countries. One of the few important Senegalese business men operating in Dakar today has admitted that he had to reduce his family obligations drastically, not only because he was married to a European, but because unless he did so, he would never be able to keep enough capital in his business. Diop Abdoulaye, in his study of the Toucouleur, [736] has protested against the use of the term family parasitism for something which 'makes it possible to help those in need, the unemployed, for example, who can then

live whilst waiting to find work; it permits those who are 471
ill, those incapable of work, and those without resources [736]
to be taken care of and not die of hunger.'

Probably the most important barrier to the accumulation
of capital has been Senegal's dependence on a one-crop [438]
economy of ground-nuts. The method of cultivation of ground-nuts and their comparatively low price per ton have worked against the creation of large scale plantations, for instance of cocoa and coffee, which have supplied individual entrepreneurs in the Western Region of Nigeria, in Ghana and in the Ivory Coast with their capital.

These are all factors to set against a situation which 463
otherwise might be explosive. Africanisation has always 563
been a problem in the Senegal and it has increased as the number of professionally trained Africans has increased. But historically, and even today, it has been most acute in the Administration, employment in which is the goal of most young Senegalese. Thus very often commerce is left with the second best. Even so French commercial houses have done far less comparatively to train up an efficient African subaltern class, let alone a managerial élite, than say a company like the United Africa Company in Nigeria. And whilst Senegal was under French control the Administration did very little indeed to encourage Africanisation of commerce.

The present day Senegalese Government, however, recognises the danger of the present position and its efforts to rectify the situation should not be interpreted as a new form of racism but as an honest attempt to maintain the present excellent racial situation. Though the Government
has placed many limitations on the autonomy of the trade [467]
unions it could not for long suppress criticism of the present structure of Dakar, particularly as Senegal, like all African countries, is subject to propaganda from every quarter. The truth is that there are far too many Europeans doing jobs that Africans could do. In small tea rooms it is not rare to be served by a French girl, for this tea shop is in

463 563 fact a family concern where it is considered more economical to employ the daughter of the family in menial work than a Senegalese. To counter this the Senegalese Government has studiously avoided any open declaration on the undesirability of this situation, but by a series of discriminatory [651] taxes hopes to make the position of the marginal *petit blanc* untenable. In this way it is hoped that European employment will be reduced by half within the next four years. Thus whilst the European population of Senegal was given [162] as 46,500 in 1956, about 40,000 in 1960, the Government hopes to have it reduced to about 30,000 by 1965.

[655] [471] One of the ways in which the Government is attempting to overcome the twin problem of European domination of commerce and the lack of private indigenous capital, is the establishment of state trading companies and co-operatives to compete in the marketing of ground-nuts and other basic Senegalese products. Also in order to reduce Senegal's dependence on expatriate technicians and minor [874] functionaries it is expanding technical education and spending considerable sums on the training of Africans overseas. In the initial stages this will only remove those Europeans who were doing jobs that can easily be taken over by Senegalese once they have received basic training. There is no reason to suppose that the European Community will diminish by much more than the numbers cited above envisaged by the planners, since the anticipated expansion of the Senegalese economy under the four-year plan should be able to absorb the marginal cases who might otherwise have been forced to return to France. Nor indeed is it the intention of the Senegalese to get rid of the Europeans for the sake of getting rid of them, since the Government still maintains that the two groups can co-exist to their mutual benefit but that it must prevent the seeds of racial tension from germinating.

563 [208] There is of course amongst the young and particularly among students some difference of opinion over this matter. Not all of them hold such liberal views, particularly

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

those who have been influenced by the barrage of anti-colonial and especially anti-French propaganda that has been current in Africa during the last two years. Many young men declare that the best thing they can do is to get rid of the French since the economy is being strangled or alternatively dominated by their former colonial masters. But this does not reflect a deep-seated dislike for France as such, indeed the opposite is nearer the case. The young man who is demanding the expulsion of the French in a heated moment today, may well be packing his bag to go and find work in France tomorrow. Once again, this division is removed when one suggests that the young Senegalese may be against the French as such in Dakar, but this does not imply that he is against either individual Frenchmen—he may well count a number amongst his personal friends—or against France and what France stands for from the point of view of culture and civilisation. Like all those who have led the anti-assimilationist campaign since the war, he is also aware of the dominating role French culture still plays in his daily life. And the wish to remove the French from Dakar may be considered an attempt to compensate for a psychological domination he resents rather than as a reaction against the French community for anything they may have done. 563 [208] 648 563

The real danger will come if the younger generation becomes economically frustrated by the French community, a situation which could lead to real racial tension. And it is this again that the Senegalese Government in its present planning intends to avert. The Senegalese leaders at present in power believe that it is their role to show how various racial groups can live together in harmony. Here it is essential to remember that Senegal has three other substantial racial minorities, the Cape Verdians, Lebanese, and Mauretanians of Arab stock, but they are not important for the purposes of this study which is primarily concerned with the effects of assimilation on the indigenous Senegalese. 563 [162]

VIII. THE SENEGALESE

> 563 The case of the one and only Senegalese is interesting. There you have a man no longer designated by his tribe, but by his colony. We are not told what tribe in Senegal he belongs to, Serer, Wolof or Lebu. That he comes from the Colony of Senegal is enough to give him some sort of status, and for native policy to know whom it is dealing with. He is not a *déraciné* from a small isolated Africa; in Bobo *cercle* he is son of the mother colony of all the colonies of the Federation. He is settled in Bobo as he might elsewhere, as a man of the new African world that has got beyond race, where natives of all races give life to the colonial structure and break it open from within.
>
> Robert Delavignette: *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*

[369] [292] If the first thing that strikes the visitor to Dakar is the large number of Europeans, the second is the homogeneous character of Senegalese society itself. It is not possible, as it is in Lagos or Leopoldville, to tell from a glance at a man or a woman's clothes from which ethnic group he or she comes. Senegal not only has an excellent record of race relations between Europeans and Africans but between the various indigenous ethnic groups. This happy position is typified by the President of the Republic, Léopold Sédar Senghor, who comes neither from the majority tribe nor the dominant religion of the country, but is a Serer and Catholic. Furthermore he is married to a French woman.

563 162 Senegal has six major ethnic groups accounting for all but 130,000 of its population of 3,100,000. The last census figures gave the Wolof as the largest ethnic group with 35 per cent, followed by the Fula with 17 per cent, the Serer, 16 per cent, Toucouleur, 9 per cent, Diola, 9 per cent, and the Mandingo 7 per cent.

[p 76]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

The French sociologist Mercier has already remarked the S 563
fundamental homogeneity of Senegal's main ethnic groups, [184]
which 'Whatever their cultural differences and whatever
their traditional hostility to one another (which has by no
means completely disappeared) all had the same type of
social and political organisation.'

Of the major groups the Wolof and the Lebou are for all W
intents and purposes indistinguishable, the Lebou being the [101]
Wolof-speaking inhabitants of the Cape Verde peninsula.
The Serer are also very closely related to the Wolof, being
considered as tribal cousins. The Toucouleur, Serer and
Fula are traditionally connected, it being held that the
Toucouleur are the result of an ancient mixing between the
Serers, with whom they have a strong joke-relationship,
and the Fulas whose language is very close to their own.
Thus nearly three-quarters of the population have closer
historical and ethnic connexions than exist in any other
area of West Africa save Hausaland in Northern Nigeria. S
With the exception of the Serers, of whom a substantial [771]
minority is Christian, these people are almost exclusively
Muslim. They also tend today to use Wolof as a lingua S
franca. Even the Diola, from the Casamance, which is [197]
in many ways a minority area of Senegal, especially because
it is cut off from the north by the Gambia, have strong
traditional connexions with the Serer and assert in effect
that they are descended from the same ancestor. This
leaves only the Mandingo people out of the pattern and
as we shall see they do tend to be a minority group in
Senegal.

There is thus at the basis of Senegalese society an indigenous S
homegeneity that is nothing to do with the 184
French policy of assimilation, and which has been greatly 563
encouraged by a common adherence to Islam, where S
Marabouts or religious leaders of one tribe have considerable [792]
influence over Muslims of other ethnic origins.

The French administration, however, through its policy of S
direct rule did in fact make one major contribution towards [631]

184 this homogeneity by reducing the traditional authority of
563 the chiefs who more than anyone else are responsible for the
[631] preservation of ethnic differences, in being the repositories of tribal customs.

For Senegal as a whole, this homogeneity does not go beyond similarities in socio-political structure, a common adherence to Islam, uniformity in styles of dress, a tradition of common relationship and a growing use of Wolof as a lingua franca. Only in the larger towns has there been
563 any general break-down of traditional tribal barriers and
[369] only in the town does one find a high incidence of inter-ethnic habitation and, more important still, inter-ethnic marriage. And since it was mainly in the towns that the French applied their policy of assimilation it is reasonable to assume that there is probably some correlation between the two. In the first place the French in Senegal have always tended to think of the local inhabitants as Senegalese rather than Wolof or Serer, which runs contrary to the common European attitude to ethnic divisions, particularly in British territories where the tendency was always to emphasise the tribal origin of an African rather than the colony in which he lived. Indeed the British administrators, as Lord Lugard himself observed, were always great partisans of particular ethnic groups. Such an attitude, however, has not always been absent in Senegal. For instance Mercier has remarked that certain European foremen in factories tended to choose workers of the same ethnic group in order to avoid possible friction, but he adds that this was not always justified.

563 In the *Quatre Communes*, which for a long time *were* Senegal
619 as far as the French were concerned, the inhabitants came
to accept from early on the idea of being Senegalese as well
[369] as Wolof and Serers. Or they might have thought of themselves parochially as St. Louisiens or Dakarois. With their elected deputy, their *Conseil-Général*, and their municipal councils, the Senegalese crossed early on the barrier between tribalism and nationalism, a result for which other African

leaders had to work so ardently and patiently many decades 563
later. Where it has often seemed to be the policy of Euro- 619
pean powers to divide and rule, here the French positively
encouraged the creation of a Senegalese identity. Faidherbe 701
created the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, whereas Lugard called 619
his force the Hausa Constabulary. For many years, Senegal
has had a romantic and sentimental place in the eyes of the 563
French, and the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, who in fact enjoyed the services of recruits from all over West Africa, are known by most Frenchmen for their services to France in both world wars. This concept of national as distinct from tribal identity in the *Quatre Communes* also influenced the educated élite from the Protectorate who were determined to participate in the privileges of the *originaires*.

A policy of assimilation that has the aim of eradicating 563
the African past and the creation of 'black Frenchmen', 619
when applied thoroughly, did in fact help to eliminate
tribal differences and create a new common culture. In 871
particular, education, which grouped children of different
ethnic groups side by side, made no concession to local 619
circumstances. They were taught about 'our ancestors the 563
Gauls' and in the best schools standards were the same as those in France. Instruction was in French from the very first years, and the school uniform was in European style. They were thus given a common meeting ground from the earliest age, with almost no concessions made to their own ethnic differences. Large numbers of Senegalese have been to France for their education ever since the days of Faidherbe, and in France they found themselves automatically dubbed as Senegalese, for few Frenchmen had time for the niceties of tribal distinctions.

It is not surprising, then, that particularly among young 563
men many friendships were made outside the tribe. Indeed today in Dakar it would be rare to find a young man with primary education who could not count many friends from
outside his own ethnic group. Marriage presented different [582]
problems. For if the young man had overcome sensitivities

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

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563 about tribe, the women, who in a Muslim society rarely
[582] gained the opportunity of education, tended naturally to
be more conservative in such matters. Nevertheless many
originaires have married outside their ethnic group and can
claim to be Senegalese and Senegalese only, for how else,
they ask, can they describe themselves when one grandparent
is Wolof, another Toucouleur and yet another Serer?
This is by no means common in Senegal, but its highest
S incidence is amongst the most assimilated groups in Senegal.

563 One of the most difficult barriers to break down in African
582 tribal society is that of the taboo on marriage outside the
tribe or clan. Onuora Nzekwu in his *Wand of Noble Wood*
[619] gives a very illuminating study of this problem. In Senegal
[369] however, there is an exceptionally high rate of inter-ethnic
marriage for Africa. Mercier, in his study of Dakar,
W observed that the rate of inter-ethnic marriage was below the
[582] Senegalese average amongst the Diola, Serer, and Wolof
where endogamy is clearest, whilst the Bambaras and
groups of the south, and particularly the Lebou who are
inter-marrying increasingly with the Wolof, were above the
average. Out of 696 monogamous families investigated,
71 per cent had married a woman of the same tribe, but
the figure of 29 per cent for mixed marriages must be
S
[595] considered extremely high for Africa. Out of 228 polygamous
families interviewed 43 per cent were all of the same
ethnic group but 57 per cent had at least one wife of different
ethnic origin. The highest incidence of inter-ethnic
S marriages in Dakar occurs amongst clerks, administrators,
[369] employees of commercial houses and the professional classes,
i.e. those who have been most affected by French assimilation
and for whom ethnic considerations are considerably
S less important than for the peasant, who is so much closer
[619] to the traditional concepts of the tribe. There is then in
Dakar, and one could apply this to other main towns, a
S
[369] significant increase in inter-ethnic marriages, though as
far as Senegal as a whole is concerned ethnic considerations
[582] in marriage are still very important. But the multiplication

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

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of inter-ethnic marriages in the towns is indicative of a 369
major social change and a reflection of the effects of an 563
assimilationist policy on the Senegalese. [582]

Though many communities in Dakar are based on ethnic and family ties, particularly amongst the immigrant Toucouleurs from the Vallée du Fleuve, Dakar is on the whole a heterogeneous city. Mercier has observed that inter-ethnic habitation is particularly frequent among young bachelors, who often club together to hire a room. This is still relatively rare in Africa except amongst educated élites. But in Senegal many young men resent being asked the question whether they are Wolof or Serer, answering only to the name Senegalese. As far as friendship outside the ethnic group and in particular living with someone from another tribe is concerned, one great advantage is the existence of a common cuisine for Wolof, Serer, Toucouleur and Lebou. There is even a national dish known as *riz sénégalais*, known further down the coast as Jollof rice. This means that not only can friends share the same plate, but a man is not frustrated in his desire to marry outside his ethnic group by fear of a foreign cuisine.

S [589 591]
S [619]
S [262]
W [262]

Another important factor in the breakdown of tribal barriers has been the urbanisation of Senegal. Over 25 per cent of the population live in towns, the bulk in Dakar, Rufisque and St. Louis and Kaolack. This represents a higher rate of urbanisation than in any other West African territory except the Western Region of Nigeria, where, it must be pointed out, urbanisation was intense long before the arrival of the Europeans and therefore does not owe its origin to colonisation as it does in Senegal. It is difficult in the present stage of research to measure the results of the inter-mixing of races in urban agglomerations. But in an environment whose *raison d'être* is completely different from that of the tribal village, the individual is subjected to so many pressures that his ethnic individuality has to be extremely strong for him not to assimilate both ideas and customs from his neighbours and above all from the

S 369 [619 162]
S [563]

Wolof MS30

369 French. The Moors are an obvious exception to this, as 563 P. Dubié has pointed out. Though they work in all the major towns of Senegal they have retained complete identity of tribal customs, even maintaining abroad the traditional hostilities between their own tribal subdivisions. The tribal structure of Dakar, which is the most heavily W industrialised single city in West Africa, gives an idea of the [369] common melting pot that the new cities and towns in S Senegal represent: Wolof constitute 25 per cent; Lebou, [162] the original inhabitants, 15 per cent; mixed Wolof-Lebou, 11 per cent; Serer, 3 per cent; Bambara, 9 per cent; Toucouleur, 10 per cent; Fula, 5 per cent; Moors, 4 per cent; Diola, 5 per cent; Soussou, 2 per cent; Cape Verdians 2 per cent. The result is that the inhabitants S of Dakar are forced to learn some form of *lingua franca*, [197] in this case Wolof or French, if they are to live in the city.

In the modern economy of the city, where one seeks work where work is and where housing is short and expensive, it is difficult for any of these groups to keep up any pretence at tribal solidarity. However, as Schapera has shown, it is possible for the African migrant working in industry 'to maintain two quite distinct spheres of human relations. The African who leaves his tribe to go and work in the town will take part in the social organisations, e.g. trade unions, he finds there, but these will affect him only as a factory worker, and will have no place in the subsistence economy which is governed by traditional tribal and social relationships. The two spheres are distinct spatially as wellas socially, and despite the exchange of ideas between them they remain none the less parallel.'

In Dakar this is particularly true of the immigrant Toucouleur from the Vallée du Fleuve, as A. Diop shows in his excellent study of Toucouleur immigration to Dakar. S But it should be noted here that the Toucouleur are not [164] permanent emigrants from their areas, and have only come to Dakar temporarily to supplement the low incomes of the Vallée du Fleuve. Permanent settlers without the ultimate

goal of return to their tribal home, even Toucouleur, 369
find it more difficult to resist the pressures of their environment, 563
and Dakar has a large number of permanent settlers,
who are first and foremost *Dakarois*.

Many of these have found a common brotherhood above 467
tribe in their trade unions. These, despite various setbacks 563
and restrictions, have been well organised in Senegal.
Indeed the 1944 decree restoring liberty of association did
much to ensure this, by insisting that trade union officials
should have good educational qualifications and that
accounts should be scrutinised by the administration.
Most of the unions belonged to one of the large French
confederations from whom they received considerable
help and advice. Since Senegal has until quite recently
had over 40 per cent of the organised workers of French
West Africa, trade unionism embraced a large number of
people of different ethnic groups brought together to seek
ends that went far beyond the limited horizons of tribal
ambition.

The influence of the towns extends beyond their limits. 369
Both in the cities, and increasingly in the villages, young [595]
men who have come in contact with the new life of Dakar or
of the other major towns tend to contract monogamous
marriages in the European style. Amongst the Diola,
as L. V. Thomas has observed, young men are now building [591]
their own houses outside the parental extended home. But
probably most important of all in the breakdown of tribal
barriers is the increase of economic individualism, the desire
to have possessions, and particularly good clothes, all of [422]
which run contrary to the traditional social system which
leads to the maximum dispersion of a man's gains amongst
his relatives.

Only the very strongest survive the effect of the city, 369
in particular a city like Dakar, the most sophisticated, the 563
most European, the city most diametrically opposed to the
tribal life of the bush. Indeed among Dakar's inhabitants
only the Moors and Toucouleur really withstand the

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

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369 immense impact of the town. They[1] live in small villages
563 made up of relations and fellow villagers. They even club
together, subscribing to a common fund to receive their
S fellows from the Fleuve, and as far as work is concerned they
[463] virtually monopolise certain jobs such as bootboys, waiters,
and newspaper sellers. This maintenance of tribal cohesion
is a difficult task in this city of French creation, where a new
community of Dakarois is rapidly coming into existence.

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665 An important factor in the breakdown of tribal ties
563 has been the creation of political parties and the creation
[619] of a new political élite that thinks in national terms.
[182] Experience in Africa has shown, however, that this can work
two ways, for many political parties are in effect organisations intended to defend ethnic interests. Senegalese politics have on the whole been remarkably free from tribalism, though Senghor did in fact achieve much of his success in the early days of the *B.D.S.* though the emphasis he laid on ethnic considerations in the organisations of his party, and certainly there have existed specifically regional and ethnic parties like *Le Mouvement Démocratique Casamançais* and the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.* But, as Kenneth Robinson pointed out in his study of Senegalese politics in *Five Elections in Africa*, these ethnic and regional aspects were compensated for by the federal aspect of the major party, *Le Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.* In 1954, in fact, all ethnic and regional sub-sections of the *B.D.S.* were abolished and individual membership was insisted on. But though this led to the breaking-away of certain elements in the Casamance, it would be fair to say that the party has been much less dominated by those regional differences that normally influence political parties in West Africa. Nevertheless, as Robinson found in the 1957
S
[666] election, there were a number of constituencies where
ethnic rivalries were more important than political issues.
W At Linguère, a single member constituency, the population
[666] was divided between Fula and Wolof in the proportion
[665] of three to two. When the sitting member, a Fula, was

[1] [i.e., The Moors and Toucouleurs in Dakar--Analyst]

563 S W [665] [666]

renominated, the Wolofs created a *Bloc Démocratique du Djollof* which polled 6,000 votes to the 8,000 of the Fula candidate.

A further commentary on the lack of tribalism in Senegal is the ethnic structure of the Government and the national assembly. The Government is composed of the President of the Republic, who is a Serer, a President of the Council of Ministers who is Toucouleur with strong Wolof ancestry, and fourteen Ministers of whom nine are Wolof, two are half-caste, one a Frenchman who has opted for Senegalese nationality, one a Diola and one a Lebou. S [645]

The ethnic repartition of the Senegalese National Assembly is equally revealing*: S 563 646 [162]

Tribe	*Percentage of population*	*Number of Deputies*	*Percentage of Deputies*
Wolof	35·0	33	41
Serer	16·0	5	6
Lebou	0·2	10	13
Toucouleur	9·0	10	13
Fula	17·0	5	6
Diola	9·0	5	6
Mandingo/Bambara	7·0	3	4
European	0·1	3	4
Metis	0·1	5	6
Rest	4·7	1	1

The above figures, with the reservations footnoted, show that the National Assembly with one or two exceptions

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* These figures were supplied to me by William J. Foltz and are based on his own research and ethnic data from the *S.E.R.E.S.A. Rapport General* lère partie, Ch. 1., p. 38. The population figures are based on old administrative censuses, which may be somewhat conservative. The figures for the Lebou seem surprisingly low. Furthermore, placing deputies under a particular ethnic grouping is often an arbitrary process, since it is in the educated classes that the highest rate of inter-ethnic marriage occurs. Furthermore the large number of Wolofs can partly be explained by the fact that anyone of mixed ethnic origin, in which one parent is Wolof, tends to call himself Wolof.

563 646 is excellently balanced from a tribal point of view. The large number of Lebou deputies is accounted for by the fact that the Lebou were the original inhabitants of Dakar, and therefore had greater facilities for education than other groups. The relatively small number of Serer deputies can be explained by the fact that the distinction between Wolof and Serer is not very pronounced. Again, the small number of Fula deputies in proportion to their size as an ethnic group is partly the result of the fact that they are a nomadic people, and partly because they are very close to the Toucouleur who have a relatively high representation. The only grossly under-represented group are the Mande, for though the Mandingo-Bambara peoples make up 7 per cent of the population and have 4 per cent of the deputies, only one of the three deputies in this group is actually Mande, who make up the greater part of this 7 per cent. Both in Senegal and neighbouring Gambia the Mandingo seem to have fared badly as a group in politics. Though only
[162] [771] 5 per cent of Senegal is Christian, five members of the Government and nearly a fifth of the National Assembly are Christian. Nor does one have to be a member of the majority tribe in a constituency to be elected by it*.

563 [771] A source of possible conflict in Senegal is the existence of a large Muslim majority and a small Christian minority representing only 5 per cent of the population. The French as the colonial power, despite their policy of assimilation, were unable to establish a strong Catholic Church in Senegal since Islam had been with the Toucouleur since the eleventh century and had already embraced most of the country by the time Faidherbe extended his protectorate. Islam in Senegal is peculiarly tolerant, not only in its concessions to traditional beliefs among more recently converted groups, but also towards Christians. In few other predominantly Muslim countries would it be possible not only to have a Catholic President but to have such a

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* I am indebted to Mr. W. J. Foltz for supplying me with most of the data on which this paragraph is based.

large proportion of Christians in the National Assembly. 563 At the time of the break up of the Mali Federation there was some attempt to disparage Senghor because of his religion, but it never gained ground. And whilst there is still in certain quarters some criticism of the presence of a Catholic President, it is not widespread. The fact that neighbouring Gambia's Chief Minister Njie is also a Catholic in a predominantly Muslim country suggests that a tolerance that is so rare amongst Muslim communities may be local to this part of the coast rather than peculiar to Senegal. Senghor himself has been particularly assiduous in his courting of the great Muslim leaders of the country. However French assimilation policy was certainly a contributory factor. Long contact with France and particularly the large number of Senegalese who have studied in France have meant that the modern élite is accustomed to the idea of Catholicism and is able to co-exist with it.

So far the picture we have drawn of modern Senegal is rather an idealised one: a large European minority is tolerated by the African majority and there is remarkably little theoretical or actual animosity towards it; it has a particularly homogeneous population in which traditional ethnic barriers are breaking down, particularly in the major towns which have been most heavily assimilated by France; there is little political friction of ethnic origin and religion does not play an important role in the determination of the country's affairs. Indeed the planning of Senegal's economic development was confided to a Catholic priest not by Senghor, as one might have imagined, but by the Premier, Mamadou Dia, a particularly devout Muslim. In some ways Senegal from a racial and ethnic point of view represents the ideal West African state. But it has its minority problems.

In a sense the Vallée du Fleuve du Sénégal can be called
a minority area, but in many ways it is an economic rather [433]
than racial problem. Though the Toucouleur tend to [735]
look down on, say, the Wolof, because they do not consider

563 them strict enough Muslims, the main distinguishing
[433] feature of their homeland, the Vallée du Fleuve du Sénégal,
[735] is its poverty compared with that of other parts of Senegal. Diop Abdoulaye in his study of Toucouleur immigration into Dakar estimates that the average *per capita* income of a Toucouleur of that region is little more than 4,000 *C.F.A.*
[434] per annum, i.e. about £6 a year. It is this rather than any real tribal differences that makes the Vallée a special problem, and this as much as any ethnic factor accounted
[665] for the existence of the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.*

563 The only real minority area in the Senegal is the Casa-
619 mance, whose special position is further emphasised by its separation from the main block of Senegal by the Gambia. In the past it has been thought of as geographically, economically, socially and even religiously separate from the rest of Senegal. A forest zone closer to its neighbours Portuguese Guinea and the Republic of Guinea, it remained very underdeveloped by the French, though the present Government is taking this fact into account with a special development programme for the area. This separateness was emphasised by the very name Casamance. The people describe themselves to this day as *Casamançais* rather than Senegalese, though this could well be accepted on the same terms as a Briton describing himself as Scots or Welsh. It is fortunate that the tendency is to talk in terms of regional rather than tribal origin. However one of the important factors in the Casamance has been tribal. The Diolas were until very recently an animist people with an entirely different social organisation from that of the main groups of Senegal, though as we have already pointed out they had traditional ties with the Serer which went as far as the injunction that a Diola should never spill the blood of a Serer. But today the Diola are being drawn into the main socio-religious pattern of Senegal. In the most recent estimate of the religious
[162] adherence of the population of Casamance, estimated at
[771] 327,500, 284,000 were Muslims, only 28,000 Christians and

the rest animists. Of course this includes the exclusively 563 619
Muslim Mandingo inhabitants of the Casamance who [162]
have been largely responsible for this proselytisation. The
Diola too is inclined more and more to imitate his Mandingo [771]
and Wolof neighbours. L. V. Thomas, who has written a monumental study on the Diola, fears: 'Soon the Diola country may be, at least in its landscape, like Senegal if no power intervenes to limit the extension of the bushfire; it will certainly become, in its people, just another African country, where only a few anthropological remains fixed by heredity will enable us to distinguish the Diola from the Wolof or the Mandingo.'

The Casamance may well be coming closer to the rest of 563
the Senegal, but it still remains a seat of opposition to the 665
Government of Senghor and Dia, and votes heavily for the 666
opposition *P.R.A.-Sénégal*. However neither of the leaders of this party, Ly Abdoulaye or Assane Seck, is *Casamançais*, and there is strong support in many towns for the *U.P.S.*, which indicates that Diola-Casamance politics are not necessarily either regional or tribal, though these are important factors.

The main social problem of the Senegal, and one which 565
both assimilation and religion seem to have been unable to break down, is that of caste or a class structure very similar to caste. All the main Senegalese tribes—the Wolof,
Lebou, Toucouleur, Serer—are divided into a series of [582]
endogamous castes. These castes differ slightly from tribe to tribe, but roughly they are divided thus:

Nobles and Freeborn
Artisans (jewellers, smiths, weavers, leatherworkers) [463]
Griots or minstrels
Liberated slaves
Slaves

(Of course domestic slaves no longer exist as such in [567]
Senegal, but families know who their slaves were.)

It is certainly easier in Senegal for a Toucouleur noble
to marry a Wolof noble than to marry a woman of inferior [582]

S

565 caste from his own tribe. The extent to which caste matters
582 is brought out by the case of a young Catholic girl from a
S devout family who, rather than marry a fellow Catholic
[595] out of caste, in the end became the polygamous wife of a
Muslim of the same caste. Within any ethnic group in
Senegal marriage out of caste is extremely rare.

S The caste system is not vicious in any real sense. For the
565 privileges of a high caste entail many obligations. Thus a
W [565] noble Wolof family will be obliged to feed and pay frequent
S [533] sums of money to its family griots (minstrels, praise-singers
and family historians) and if they fail to do this the griot
[814] is able to shame them publicly as a poor or mean family,
something a Wolof would avoid at all costs. Likewise the
S artisan castes have a monopoly in their respective trades,
[463] since it would be impossible for a noble or free man to
[326] undertake the work of a jeweller or smith. Nevertheless in
Senegalese society the term 'bijoutier' or 'tisserand' has
S slight contempt attached to it. The only caste to suffer
[567] socially in any way is of course that designated slave,
because of the implications of such a status. In social
investigations amongst the factory workers of Dakar, M.
André Hauser found very few indeed who would admit to
being of slave caste.

At present it is certainly a disadvantage to belong to any of the inferior castes, and though one hears of a few cases of open clashes between castes, in the present state of affairs it is certain that a number of young men resent this classification of people into superior and inferior groups and it is very much less important to them than to the older generation.

S 565 Early in 1961 *Agence Presse Sénégalaise* reported 'bloody
764 clashes between griots and non-griots at Diack'. These
578 ended with several dead and a number of wounded and
started as a result of the refusal of non-griots to accept the
burial of griots in their burial ground. The Minister of the
S Interior himself went to settle the dispute and gathered the
[641] whole population to tell them that his Government gave

equal status to all Senegalese and wanted to make everyone 565,
true Senegalese citizens whether they were griots, 764
leather-workers or jewellers. Afterwards the non-griots agreed that 578
the griots who had just died should be buried 'in the same [641]
way as anyone else, and as a beginning they agreed to let
the burial of the victim of the incident take place, not in
the traditional baobab but in Diack earth.'

In the Government today there are, amongst those 565
members belonging to tribes with a class system only two of
inferior caste, one being a 'bijoutier' and one a griot. It is
said of another that he is of slave origin, but this is not
certain because politicians often try to attribute inferior
caste to their opponents. In the Assembly, of the members [646]
with caste all are noble or freeborn with the exception of
one 'bijoutier', and one griot. It is thus at present difficult to
get on in politics unless one is noble or freeborn. Indeed
chiefly connexion is important, even though chiefs are no [631]
longer of significance administratively. Thus in 1957
Kenneth Robinson wrote:

> Membership of chiefly families is, nevertheless, an important source [554]
> not only of prestige but of political interest. In many interviews
> with political leaders in the smaller townships and villages they
> almost invariably defined their own position, and that of their
> fellows, in part by reference to their relationship with the ruling
> families, or with the indigenous caste system.

Mr. William Foltz, who is making a detailed survey of [665]
Senegalese politics, has however observed that the local
party groups in the country are increasingly representative
of the inferior castes and many of the important backroom
boys are of inferior caste, which suggests that there may be a
change from the present situation at the next elections.
But so far, as Mercier has observed, it does not look as
though high standing in the modern context can yet [554]
completely redeem traditional inferiority.

The caste system in Senegal is one of the most delicate
problems confronting the Senegalese Government today.

565 [563] Influenced heavily by the Revolutionary doctrine of liberty, equality and fraternity, and having broken down barriers to this at the inter-ethnic level, the Government finds it most difficult to break it down at the level of the caste. Significantly, it was the Minister of the Interior himself who laid down government attitudes to caste at the troubles at Diack and one must hope that such trouble will soon disappear.

IX. THE FUTURE

> We must really decolonise ourselves down to our innermost hearts and not merely at the level of appearances. Independence is a period of dismantling and creating. It is a 'creative destruction', to use the phrase of a well-known economist. 000
>
> MAMADOU DIA

IN many independent African countries today it is difficult to elicit from politicians exactly what economic, social and political policy they propose to follow. Quite naturally, they talk in terms of achieving the maximum good for their people: but as often as not they have not worked out the priorities of industrialisation as against agriculture, health against education, roads against railways. Many describe their economic policies as socialist, a term which on investigation turns out to embrace advanced welfare state projects as well as questionable capitalist enterprises. In Senegal, however, the student is fortunate in having two leaders—President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia—who have given not only considerable thought to the future economic and political structure of their country but have also put their ideas down on paper. Senghor has been the political theoretician of Senegal, Mamadou Dia its economist. 668

Both philosopher and economist show in their theories an intense desire to find 'African' solutions to their problems, and yet to incorporate the best the Western world has taught them. Senghor talks of the symbiosis of two cultures to both of which, as a Senegalese who has experienced France's assimilationist policy, he feels legitimately heir. Both have as their goal the creation of an African socialist state, but one that shall not stand in isolation from France and the Western world. All they ask is that the technical and political experience of the West should be adapted to the African

668 context. Whilst accepting many of Marx's theories, Senghor feels that socialism must be adapted to African realities, of which Marx, writing in the nineteenth century, was quite unaware. Also he refuses, not only as an African but as a Catholic, to accept Marxist atheism. Senegal must above all be an African state, but he is opposed to what he calls the fashionable habit of rejecting Europe of whatever political shade. 'We shall continue to borrow from Europe the weapons of our liberation', he writes, 'above all socialism'. Once again it will be socialism in principle, adapted to the particular circumstances of Senegal and incorporating the keen African sense of community responsibility as well as European socialist experience in dealing with the problems of an advanced agricultural and industrial society.

Internally it is his aim to make of Senegal a model socialist state without disrupting the existing economy or social structure too violently. But his goal is a greater one: that is that Senegal, and indeed Africa, should make a major contribution to what he describes as the *Civilisation de l'universel.* It will be possible and proper for Senegal to absorb influences from outside provided they contribute towards this goal. It is his aim to achieve harmony between all races and ethnic groups in Senegal, to show that Africans, despite their bitter experiences in the past, harbour no bitterness towards their fellow men. And on the African plane, despite the unfortunate outcome of the Mali Federation, he is still a fervent believer in the ultimate goal of African unity, though much less enthusiastic about the federal form of government. The failure of the Mali Federation is taken not as a disaster for its eventual achievement but as an object lesson about the obstacles that can present themselves.

Senegal then is to be a model socialist state, aiming not only at internal harmony, but at the greater harmony of Africa and the world. Mamadou Dia has described this role succinctly in *Nations africaines et solidarité mondiale*:

> That is why the African nations who tomorrow will be called

upon to play a historic role will be neither Negro, Berber, nor 668
Arab nations, nor Christian, Muslim, nor animist nations. They will surely be strongly marked by the influence of different biological factors, and by the influence of different philosophies of their environment; but they will be nothing if not a synthesis, if not a civilisation. It is under this condition that they will be truly active element in the post-Marxian revolution of the twentieth century.

Reading the political philosophy of both Senghor and Mamadou Dia, one is tempted to say this humanism is all very admirable but what have such high-flown ideas got
to do with a nation of three million poor people still living [433]
barely above subsistence level and of whom the majority [412]
of adults are still illiterate? Indeed, Senghor the philosopher and poet comes in for criticism by some students of African politics for his advocacy of this cultural cross breeding, for his apparent excessive attachment to the West. Will not, they ask, someone more African, more a politician and less a poet, be more typical of the African politicians of the future? This is perhaps not only to misunderstand Senghor, but also the Senegalese. Senghor may seem to live in the clouds,
uttering fine phrases in enviable French, but the last fifteen [665]
years have shown him as a masterly political tactician. He broke away from Lamine Guèye and the *S.F.I.O.* to form his own party at just the right psychological moment. And when he felt an end had to be brought to the Mali Federation he accomplished it without shedding one drop of blood, to the surprise not only of foreign observers but particularly of his Soudanese partners. Today opposition to Senghor comes mainly from fellow intellectuals, whilst his standing with the people of the countryside remains high. His opposition is no less inclined to lengthy discourses on the philosophical foundations of the state. Ly Abdoulaye
and Assane Seck of the *P.R.A.* are both of the University of [665]
Dakar; Majhemout Diop of the *P.A.I.* is a doctrinaire Communist; and Cheikh Anta Diop, as we have seen, has spent most of his time on the rehabilitation of African history.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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000 spent most of his time on the rehabilitation of African history.

631 Of course there would be considerable justification for such criticisms if Senghor and his Government were not in fact getting down to the fundamental reorganisation of Senegal. Already since the days of the French, the whole country has undergone a complete administrative transformation. Before independence the country was divided into *cercles* and *subdivisions*, under French and occasionally African administrators, and *cantons*, run by traditional chiefs as agents of the administration. This structure has been completely changed to give the administration and therefore the Government closer contact with the people. Previously the traditional chief, albeit an agent of the administration, was interposed between the administrator and his people. Now that the *chef de canton* has been eliminated and the *canton* has been redesignated as an *arrondissement*, presided over by an administrative official, working under the *commandant de cercle*, the Government has rid the country of what the Minister of Interior, Valdiodio N'Diaye, has described as an anachronistic institution. The *cercles*
[635] are grouped into seven regions, each with its Governor and regional assembly, which deliberates on the regional budget. These seven regions have been laid out so as to correspond with the major economic zones of the country, making concessions only to ethnic factors and problems of communications. The whole field administration outside headquarters has been completely Africanised since July
[563] 1960, though there are many Europeans serving as 'technical advisers' in the Government in Dakar.

668 But most important of all is the proposed four-year development plan for the Senegal which envisages a major revolution in the education, health and economy of the country. This plan was drawn up after nearly eighteen months of intensive research in Senegal by the Révérend Père Lebret, and his team of European and African researchers. The whole plan was directed by Mamadou Dia,

whose economic ideas are well known from various books 668 he has written, more especially his *Nations africaines et solidarité mondiale* and *Réflexions sur l'économie de l'Afrique noire.* Dia is essentially a socialist, who believes however that European socialism could never really identify itself with Africa, because, as he points out, so much of the improvement in the living conditions of European workers was founded on the economic expansion resulting from nineteenth and twentieth-century colonialism. And he remarks bitterly that even today one sixth of the world's population, mainly white, enjoys 80 per cent of the world's income. He feels that political liberation is nothing without economic liberation and that this is the great challenge to the young states of Africa. He does not believe in any tailor-made answer to this challenge, whether it be Communist or Western in origin. The Senegalese answer must be based on Senegalese realities, taking into account the experience of other underdeveloped countries, in which he is well versed.

This explains the eighteen-month long 'inventory' made 433 by Father Lebret and his team of every aspect of Senegalese 668 life. Dia sees one of the greatest dangers of Africa in its present economic balkanisation, dangers which provide economic backing to political demands for African unity. Dakar's many industries were of course planned to serve the former French West Africa and are now at the mercy of the individual economic policies of its seven French-speaking neighbours. Such a situation will make it impossible for large scale and rational economic development. Nor does he see in industrialisation the solution to all the country's problems. Indeed the basic problem is the raising of the general standard of living of the country, particularly of those areas that lag behind the rest. Above all he is not going to follow slavishly the ideas of the West or the East. Senegal's development is to be undertaken in the light of Senegal's own problems

This then is the background to the impressive and far

433 reaching economic development plan. Mamadou Dia
668 has described the plan as the 'décollage' or taking-off point of the country's development. The plan is the expression of the African socialism of which Senghor and Dia have so long dreamed. It has two important points. Relatively little emphasis is placed on industrialisation, and fundamental to the development of the country are
[494] 'rural animation' and co-operatives through which the people will be made aware of the great future that could be theirs if only they co-operate in the realisation of this plan. Already 80 per cent of peasant farmers are organised in co-operatives.

Senegal's economy is based today on the export of its ground-nut crop of just under 800,000 tons a year. This has been produced to the detriment of subsistence crops, with the absurd result that Senegal, a basically agricultural country, is importing foodstuffs to the tune of £15 million a year. Furthermore there has been a great disparity in the economic and social development of the towns in com-
[369] parison with the bush. Thus whilst Dakar is one of the most modern and prosperous towns in West Africa, the Vallée du Fleuve is abysmally poor and Casamance hitherto neglected. Thus the emphasis is on rural development; the
[871] extension of educational facilities to a population only 30 per cent of whose children go to school; then the increase in medical facilities; the supply of water to villages without it; and in particular the opening-up of hitherto neglected regions by improved communications, which includes the
[491] tarring of over 1,000 miles of roads and improvement of 600 miles of dirt road. But above all the emphasis is on the increase of home food crops and the widening of the variety of foodstuffs available to the peasants. It is estimated that if the plan works out, then the global index of production, taken as 100 in 1959, will be up to 137 in 1964. New industries such as the phosphate works at Taiba, an oil refinery, chemical factories and textile printing works will provide 10,000 new jobs, and thus absorb some of the unemployed

school leavers who characterise every West African town 433
from Dakar to Douala, and whose numbers will increase 668
in future under the new plan, since by 1964-65 it is hoped [871]
over 50 per cent of children of school age will be at primary
school.

The whole plan is to cost £135 million, much of the 433
money to be drawn from abroad, and much from private 471
sources. As can be seen from the table below the emphasis 668
is on social improvement rather than the creation of
great gesture industries.

	Percentages	
	Of public investments	*Of total investments*
Infrastructure	33·9	18·75
Agriculture	18·0	13·4
Commerce and Industry ..	7·0	44·4
Education	12·2	6·7
Health	5·3	2·9
Housing	7·2	10·9
Administrative	5·5	3·0

It is a socialist plan at heart. The state will be taking [655]
over large sectors of the economy. Already the state trading
organisation for the marketing of ground-nuts with the aid [474]
of local co-operatives has taken over the marketing of over a
quarter of the crop from private commerce. But it is doing this in direct competition with them, to ensure that the organisation is commercially viable. Senghor believes 'Where private capitalism comes into peaceful competition with socialism, the latter must, I feel sure, emerge triumphant . . .'

On the other hand Senegal is not trying to discourage private enterprise, for, as can be seen from the above table, it accounts for much of the capital for the plan. Indeed, particularly favourable concessions are made to it. What

433 668 [491] the Government is trying to do is take out of its hands the control of the basic economy, such as the ground-nut crop, and to ensure that the maximum benefit accrues to Senegal from overseas investment.

The distinguishing feature of the plan is its reliance not on *investissement humain* on Chinese lines, a method which tends to be favoured by the Guinea and Mali Governments, but on *animation rural.* It is believed that compulsory forced [466] labour is not satisfactory to the people who are undertaking it, even if it is ostensibly in their own interests, first because it is compulsory, and secondly because it can suffer from excessive planning by the centre, so that the people may be 'investing' their labour in things which in the first place they do not want, and which in the second place fail, as certain agricultural schemes have done in Russia and China, as a result of overcentralised planning.

433 668 654 Basically *animation* is what we would call 'community development', but it is to be operated in the context of the general plan for the Senegal, touching on education and medical services as well as economic development. The idea is that people in villages should be asked what they want: a new road; a new dispensary etc. It will then be explained to them that such things have not been achieved up till now through lack of funds but that the Government is prepared to put its services at the disposal of the villagers to build a road or some such if the villagers are prepared to provide labour. The object then is to find out what villag- [476] ers really want and to stimulate them into wanting them enough to supply labour for them. In any chosen area, then, a member of the Ministry of Planning and Development (Animation Section) will go into the village and enlist the people's co-operation in selecting an intelligent man who is sufficiently respected both by the traditionalists and by the youth to be able to put over these new ideas of community development. He is then sent on an 'animation course' where he is taught improved farming and other methods and is (it is hoped) inspired with the need for

progress. This he then transmits to the village, and in 433
Casamance *animation* has worked to the extent of building a 668
thirty-five kilometre road which cut the journey between 654
two important villages by nearly fifty kilometres. In the [491]
Vallée du Fleuve, people who never grew rice before have [243]
now quadrupled their incomes by producing rice under a [434]
rural animation scheme.

All this President Dia hopes will raise the standard of living of each man by 3.5 per cent each year, doubling it by the fourth four year plan in 1975.

The plan is an ambitious one, an attempt to create a new 668
Senegal synthesising the best of Africa and Europe. If it works, and the political future of both Senghor and Dia may well depend on this, then Senegal may become a pilot nation for Africa both economically and culturally. Senegal will then be in a sense a justification for the French assimilation policy, for although it failed in its attempts to assimilate the Senegalese both culturally and politically it has left profound marks on Senegalese society. And even if the experience of assimilation in Senegal has demonstrated the immense difficulties not only of one group trying to assimilate the other to its own standards, but of even getting the assimilating group to accept the other group as political and cultural equals, the end result may be the production of an African society which, whilst maintaining its own national identity, may prove a bridge between Africa and Europe and their two cultures.

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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originaire - a person born in one of the quatre communes, thus having the status of a French citizen (citoyen).

sujet - a person who does not enjoy the rights of a French citizen.

Quatre Communes - Four Towns: Dakar, Gorée, St. Louis and Rufisque.

Conseil-Général - General Council

For information on the political organization of

the Region	see category	635
the Cercle	" "	634
the Arrondissement (or Canton under Colonial Government)	see category	632
the Quatre Communes	see category	633